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THE DEREGULATION OF LIMITED LIABILITY
AND THE DEATH OF PARTNERSHIP
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN*
The popularity of the partnership form of business1 indicates that an
organizational form in which some owners can be held personally liable
for the firm's debts2 is efficient for many firms. This could be because, for
many firms, individual liability reduces the firm's credit costs more than
it increases owners' risk-bearing, monitoring, or other costs. This Arti-
cle, however, suggests an alternative explanation: the partnership form is
attractive for many firms on the margin only because of the regulatory
costs of limited liability, including double corporate taxation and limita-
tions on organizational form.3
Recent developments provide a valuable opportunity to test this expla-
nation. Many lawyers and legislators have become interested in a new
limited liability business form, the "limited liability company" (LLC),
that lets firms adopt limited liability without many of the tax and other
costs that once attended limited liability. If this Article's regulatory ex-
planation of partnership is correct, the partnership form of business will
greatly diminish in importance. After a transitional period, partnership
will survive, if at all, as a residual form for firms that have no customized
agreement.
This Article discusses three principal aspects of the story of the death
of partnership. Sections I and II show why tax and regulatory concerns
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. Funding was provided by the
Sarah Scaife Foundation. Helpful comments were provided by Barry Adler, Ronald Gilson, and
Robert Keatinge.
1. There were approximately 1.7 million general and limited partnership federal tax returns
filed in 1989. See 1990 I.R.S. ANN. REP. 30 (July 1991). As discussed in Section I(B)(2) infra,
limited partnerships usually are limited liability firms because often the general partners are corpora-
tions. For a brief discussion of the implication of this Article's analysis on limited liability forms,
including limited partnership, see infra Section V.
2. This refers to the owners' liability in excess of their investments in the firm, normally for
debts remaining unpaid after the firm's assets are exhausted. It is alternatively referred to in this
Article as "unlimited" or "individual" liability.
3. For other evidence of how regulation rather than efficiency shapes organizational form, see
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991)
(showing how regulation has inhibited monitoring by large shareholders); Mark J. Roe, Political
Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1469 (1991) (mutual fund
industry developed in accordance with regulatory framework established early in its history).
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may be primarily responsible for firms' adoption of the partnership form.
Section I discusses the regulatory costs of limited liability and how the
development and tax recognition of the LLC only recently have relaxed
impediments on limited liability. Section II discusses the other side of
the regulatory explanation: why firms would be expected to reject unlim-
ited liability of owners in the absence of regulatory incentives.
Sections III and IV discuss why, as a normative matter, regulatory
constraints on limited liability should be lifted. Section III demonstrates
that the interests of involuntary creditors do not justify inhibiting the
emergence of LLCs. Section IV shows that the partnership form should
not be maintained as a way to classify business forms for tax purposes.
Finally, Section V includes a speculation on the near-term future of
LLCs, partnerships, and other business forms.
I. A REGULATORY THEORY OF UNLIMITED LIABILITY
This Section shows how general partnership has been sustained as a
popular business form by regulatory inhibitions on adopting limited
liability.
A. Pre-LLC Restrictions on Limited Liability
Until recently, firms had four general methods of adopting limited lia-
bility: (1) incorporating; (2) forming a limited partnership; (3) forming a
noncorporate, nonlimited partnership type of limited liability business;
and (4) forming a partnership and entering into nonrecourse contracts.
As reviewed below, each of these alternatives involves significant costs.
1. Incorporation
Incorporation is, of course, the traditional route to limited liability.
Although not necessarily a feature of the early corporation,4 limited lia-
bility has come to be regarded as the feature that most clearly distin-
guishes corporations from other business forms-that is, as the most
distinctively "corporate" feature.5 But there are two types of costs asso-
ciated with seeking limited liability through incorporation.
The first cost is the extra tax burden associated with "two-tier" taxa-
4. For a good discussion of this point, see Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate
Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986).
5. See EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 399
(1929).
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tion of corporate income-at the corporate level when income is earned,
and again at the shareholder level when it is distributed as dividends.
Under the current tax structures---a corporate-level tax rate comparable
to the individual-level rate and nd reduced rate for capital gains-most
firms and holders suffer a tax penalty from incorporation whether in-
come is retained by the corporation or paid out as dividends as soon as it
is earned.6
Corporate shareholders can avoid double taxation by electing to be
taxed under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the
Subchapter S election imposes many organizational restrictions on the
firm. For example, the Code prohibits more than thirty-five sharehold-
ers,7 restricts who may own stock,8 forbids an allocation of dividend and
liquidation rights that creates more than one "class" of stock,9 and pro-
hibits the S Corporation from owning a corporate subsidiary.10 A corpo-
ration may lose its Subchapter S status, potentially creating substantial
additional tax liabilities, if at any time it stops meeting these qualifica-
tions, as when stock is transferred to a nonqualifying holder."t
S Corporation treatment also has several operational drawbacks com-
pared to partnership: S Corporation shareholders must allocate income,
loss, deduction, and credit in direct proportion to their interests in the
corporation; 2 the shareholders' basis for purposes of limiting losses and
deductions they can take in a given year does not include their share of
the firm's debts as in a partnership;13 and a shareholder contributing
property to an S Corporation can avoid recognizing gain only if the
transferor controls the corporation and takes stock in return. 14
These tax drawbacks of incorporation do not explain the long preva-
6. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND Fi-
NANCE, 317-26 (4th ed. 1990); Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After 30 Years,
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1988, at 99.
7. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (1988).
8. All shareholders of Subchapter S corporations must be individuals, estates, or certain types
of trusts and may not be nonresident aliens. Id. § 1361(b)(1).
9. Id. § 1361(b)(1)(D).
10. Id. § 1361(b)(2)(A).
11. Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.136-I creates the risk of termination of Subchapter S
election if the "one class of stock" requirement is violated. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.136-1, 56 Fed. Reg.
38391 (1991). A pending bill would relax these restrictions by focusing on the shareholders' rights
rather than actual distributions.
12. I.R.C. § 1377.
13. Id. § 1366(d). Cf id § 752(a).
14. Id. § 351(a).
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lence of partnership prior to 1909 when the corporate tax was instituted.
Partnership may have developed originally as a method of avoiding legal
and religious prohibition of usury."i Partnership survived the rise of the
corporation prior to 1909 because of state-law impediments to incorpora-
tion. At first, firms could incorporate only by, in effect, purchasing spe-
cial charters from state legislatures. Incorporation became more widely
available under general incorporation statutes, beginning with New
Jersey's in 1875, and general incorporation was prevalent by the turn of
the century.' 6 Indeed, the institution of the corporate tax may be ex-
plained partly as a method of controlling the corporate form after it had
been freed from state legislative control.17
Despite the introduction of general incorporation laws, state statutory
inhibitions on incorporation persist today. Corporation statutes typically
prescribe rules that may not be optimal for the parties to closely held
firms."i These include centralized management, 19 extensive fiduciary du-
ties of directors and shareholders,2" and nondiscrimination within classes
of stock.2 Shareholders cannot always effectively draft around these
15. See WILLIAM MITCHELL, Early Forms of Partnership, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANoLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 183 (1909); JOHN THOMAS NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF
USURY, 133-53 (1957); Edgar Salin, Usury, in 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 193, 195 (Edwin R.A.
Seligman ed., 1934).
16. For general works tracing the history of modern corporation law, see RonERT HESSEN, IN
DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION (1979); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSI-
NESS CORPORATION, 1780-1970 (1970). For a discussion of the role of state competition in produc-
ing modem general corporation statutes, see Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional
Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1985).
17. See RICHARD B. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 37 (1951) (quoting President
Taft's speech introducing the corporate tax law). These regulatory explanations for partnership an-
swer Saul Levmore's question as to why partnership flourished prior to 1909 when incorporation was
a "tax bargain." See Saul Levmore, Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies, and Taxes: A Com-
ment on the Survival of Organizational Forms, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 489, 490 (1992).
18. For a discussion of why state legislatures do not compete for chartering business by opti-
mizing provisions for close corporations, see Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of
Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 393-95 (1992). Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theo-
ries of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. Rnv. 80, 123-24 (1991) (showing why there is no state competi-
tion for statutory terms that facilitate contracting for limited liability).
19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.01 (1984).
20. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991) (fairness and procedural rules for director
conflict-of-interest transactions); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors held
liable for recommending sale of company without following requisite procedure to determine ade-
quacy of price).
21. See Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Asarco,
Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985); Bank of New York Co. v. Irving
Bank, Corp., 536 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). But see Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/9
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rules. Some corporate statutes let parties to closely held firms enter into
certain types of agreements, such as opting out of management by a
board of directors, if the firms qualify as close corporations and comply
with procedural requirements.22 An agreement that does not comply
with these requirements and that is inconsistent with the statutory norms
may not be enforced even if all shareholders are parties.2 a
Even firms that successfully qualify for close corporation status do not
have complete flexibility. The security of close corporation agreements is
jeopardized by statutes and case law providing for close corporation dis-
solution and buyout remedies in the event of "oppression" of minority
shareholders, irrespective of the presence or absence of specific agree-
ments.24  Although close corporation statutes do allow some types of
agreements, 25 corporations cannot opt out of liability for some fiduciary
378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977) (permitting discrimination among shareholders within class by original
charter provision).
22. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 343, 350 (1991) (permitting certain agreements in
firms that elect close corporation status by certificate provision); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT § 7.32 (1991) (permitting certain agreements in nonpublicly traded corporation if agreement is
set forth in articles of incorporation and bylaws, or is in writing and "made known to the corpora-
tion," in either event only if approved by all those who are shareholders at the time). Ian Ayres says
that these provisions may be useful in preventing close corporation precedents from spilling over
into, and causing uncertainty in, general corporation cases. See Ayres, supra note 18, at 395. This
raises the question whether the uncertainty costs from spillover effects exceeds those from the risk of
invalidating noncomplying contracts.
23. One leading case did enforce the agreement in these circumstances. See Zion v. Kurtz, 405
N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980). However, there was a vigorous dissent, and the majority opinion noted
specific circumstances that justified enforcement:
Since there are no intervening rights of third persons, the agreement requires nothing that
is not permitted by statute, and all of the stockholders of the corporation assented to it, the
certificate of incorporation may be ordered reformed, by requiring Kurtz to file the appro-
priate amendments, or more directly he may be held estopped to rely upon the absence of
those amendments from the corporate charter.
Id. at 685 (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of how the courts have nullified statutes that are unresponsive to the needs of
close corporations, but that criticizes Zion for upsetting an arguably rational legislative judgment to
compartmentalize close corporation cases, see Ayres, supra note 18, at 383-88.
24. For a case in which a shareholder was held entitled to the statutory remedy of a fair-value
buyout notwithstanding a buy-sell agreement providing for sale at a much lower price, see In re Pace
Photographers, Ltd., 525 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1988). For a discussion of the relationship between
express shareholder agreements and the oppression remedy, see Robert B. Thompson, Corporate
Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 226-28 (1988). For
discussions of the problems of ex post second guessing of close corporation agreements, see Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 287
(1986).
25. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.32(a)(8) (1988) (permitting agreements "not
contrary to public policy").
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breaches, creating costly uncertainty as to what is not included.26 By
contrast to corporation law, partnership statutes broadly permit the part-
ners to agree to any form of management 27 and to waive fiduciary
duties.28
2. Limited Partnership
The parties can adopt limited liability without incorporation by form-
ing a limited partnership. Although a limited partnership must have at
least one general partner who has unlimited liability,29 the parties effec-
tively can obtain complete limited liability by incorporating the general
partner.
The principal problem with using the limited partnership form is that
the parties are restricted in their form of organization if they wish to
achieve complete one-tier partnership taxation. The business is a corpo-
ration for tax purposes if it has three or four of the "corporate" charac-
teristics: limited liability, centralized management, free transferability,
and continuity of life.30 As discussed in more detail below, 3 1 this classifi-
26. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) (permitting corporations to opt out of
damage liability for director fiduciary breach, but not for acts that involve a breach of the "duty of
loyalty," that are "not in good faith," that involve "intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law," or "from which the director derived an improper personal benefit."). None of the relevant
terms is defined in the statute. For discussions of the statutes that permit opt out from the liability
for fiduciary breach see Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors' Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295
(1988); Harvey Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMPLE L.
REV. 13 (1988); Dennis R. Honabach, All That Glitters: A Critique of the Revised Virginia Stock
Corporation Act, 12 J. CORP. L. 433 (1987).
27. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 18 (1914) (the rights and duties of the partners deter-
mined "subject to any agreement between them"); 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RdBsTEIN,
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.03 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
28. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 21 (1914) (partner has duty to account for self-dealing
only with respect to transaction that is "without the consent of the other partners"). For cases
recognizing the validity of fiduciary duty waivers in the partnership, see Jerman v. O'Leary, 701
P.2d 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (self-dealing); Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981)
(partnership opportunities). For a discussion of the scope of the opt-out power in the partnership,
see 2 BROMBERG & RISTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h).
Saul Levmore views the persistence of incorporation as "striking" in light of my discussion of the
regulatory and tax advantages of partnership. Levmore, supra note 17, at 490-91. This misses a
central point of my Article. For the reasons discussed infra in Part II, most firms would choose to
incorporate or form other limited liability business forms but for these tax and regulatory considera-
tions. The "striking fact," therefore, is not that firms incorporate, but rather that they choose to
form partnerships.
29. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 101(7) (1985) (defining "limited
partnership").
30. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1991).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/9
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cation system can impose significant governance costs.
Even apart from tax-related organizational burdens, the limited part-
nership form imposes costly restrictions on obtaining limited liability.
The most important is the "control rule," which provides that limited
partners may be held liable as general partners if they take part in the
control of the business.3 2 Although this rule has been eroded by a wide
"safe harbor" of acts that do not constitute taking part in control,33 the
rule still effectively inhibits some limited partner actions, such as taking
over a failing or mismanaged firm. Limited partnership statutes also im-
pose strict remedies for distributions even by solvent firms that may, in
effect, force the firms to retain earnings that are nevertheless being taxed
directly to the partners.34
3. Other Limited Liability Business Forms
The states have promulgated limited liability business forms that elimi-
nate some of the cumbersome restrictions of corporations and limited
partnerships, including business trusts3" and limited partnership associa-
tions.36 The Delaware business trust statute, in particular, contains no
restrictions on the form of business.3 7
There are, however, two serious problems with these business forms
that inhibit their use. First, there is a question whether the Internal Rev-
enue Service (I.R.S.) recognizes these forms as partnerships for tax pur-
poses.3" Although parties may be able to obtain private I.R.S. rulings
favoring partnership classification,39 acquiring these rulings is costly."
31. See infra § IV(B).
32. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303 (1985); UNIFORM LTD. PARTNER-
SHIP AcT § 7 (1916).
33. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303(b) (1985).
34. See UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 17(4) (1914); REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PART-
NERSHIP ACT § 608(a) (1985). These provisions are criticized in Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied
Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY LJ. 835, 888-89 (1988).
35. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801-3815 (1983).
36. For discussions of this form of business see WARREN, supra note 5, at 508-14; Wayne M.
Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 387,
393-94 (1991); Edward R. Schwartz, The Limited Partnership Association-An Alternative to the
Corporation for the Small Business with "Control" Problems?, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 29 (1965).
37. See Ribstein, supra note 18, at 125.
38. For rulings classifying limited partnership associations as corporations for tax purposes, see
Rev. Rul. 71-434, 1971-2 C.B. 430, 431-32 (Ohio association); Rev. Rul. 71-277, 1971-1 C.B. 422,
423 (Pennyslvania association); Giant Auto Parts, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 307 (1949). These rul-
ings are discussed in Gazur & Goff, supra note 36, at 394.
39. There is one private ruling recognizing partnership classification of a Michigan partnership
1992]
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Accordingly, these forms cannot be viable alternatives to partnership un-
til the I.R.S. issues rulings generally classifying them as partnerships.
A second problem inhibiting use of these forms is that they are not
clearly recognized by states other than the state of formation. Under
general conflict-of-law principles, forum states ordinarily recognize cor-
porate liability limitations and internal governance rules of the state of
formation.4 ' The same rule probably applies to limited partnerships. 42
In any event, the states have specific statutory provisions concerning rec-
ognition of foreign corporations43 and limited partnerships.' But a state
might not recognize the limited liability or other features of a partnership
association or business trust formed in another state.45 This limits not
association. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 75-05-290-310A (May 29, 1975). For a discussion of the problems
connected with obtaining private rulings, see infra text accompanying notes 217-19.
40. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971) (law of state of incorpora-
tion ordinarily governs as to corporate "internal affairs" unless another state has more significant
interests); Id. at § 307 (law of state of formation governs as to extent of shareholder's liability to
creditors). See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839) (although corporations not consti-
tutionally protected as "citizens," Court presumed that states would grant comity to foreign corpo-
ration law by recognizing foreign corporations).
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 295(3) cmt. d (1971).
43. See REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, Ch. 15 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, subchapter
XV, §§ 371-85 (1991).
44. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 901-08 (1985).
45. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(2) (1914) provides that an association that otherwise falls
within the general definition of partnership (see id. §§ 6-7) is not a partnership if it is formed under
any other statute, including a statute of another state. Accordingly, a state may treat a foreign non-
statutory business form such as a business trust as a partnership even if the organizing state's law
provides for limited liability. Beneficiaries of a business trust have been held entitled to limited liabil-
ity only if they do not participate in management. See Greco v. Hubbard, 147 N.E. 272, 275 (Mass.
1925); ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 174 (1968); WARREN, supra
note 5, at 384-98. See also Thompson v. Schmitt, 274 S.W. 554 (Tex. 1925) (business trust holders
did not have limited liability because this vehicle illegally circumvented the limited partnership,
which was the statutory vehicle for noncorporate limited liability).
Under conflict-of-law principles, a forum state does not have to recognize the limited liability of a
firm formed under another state's law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b)
(1971) provides for consideration in selecting the applicable law of "the relevant policies of the
forum ..... " In Means v. Limpia Royalties, 115 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), the court refused
to recognize the limitation of liablity of an Oklahoma business trust, citing Texas policy similar to
that articulated in Thompson.
Full faith and credit and due process constrain application of forum rules, but probably only
where the forum lacks minimum contacts with the transaction. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1981). The Commerce Clause might be interpreted to bar states from applying their part-
nership laws to foreign-state limited liability firms. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69
(1987), the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause did not bar states from applying their
own corporate laws to regulate interstate tender offers, emphasizing that the statutes did not subject
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/9
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only the usefulness of these hybrid limited liability forms to business peo-
ple who adopt them, but also the benefits to state bar groups and others
who innovate hybrid forms.
4. Limited Liability by Nonrecourse Contract
Parties to firms could obtain limited liability, governance flexibility,
and flow-through tax treatment by forming general partnerships or sole
proprietorships and agreeing with creditors to limit their liability to the
amount of their investments in certain assets.4 6 The problem with this
approach is that, in the absence of incorporation or other statutory rec-
ognition, it is costly to contract with individual creditors either sepa-
rately or by informing them of limited liability terms that apply to all the
firm's creditors.47 Moreover, state statutes increase these costs, even be-
yond those that are logistically necessary, by imposing personal liability
on parties who signal limited liability by posing as corporations or lim-
ited partnerships.48
B. Development of Limited Liability Companies
Beginning with Wyoming in 1977, several states now have statutes
providing for LLCs.49 Although these statutes vary, virtually all share
some characteristics: limited liability for all members without regard to
corporate activities to inconsistent regulation and that the states had the power to regulate the inter-
na affairs of locally incorporated firms. This reasoning might be turned around to invalidate legisla-
tion that interferes with other states' attempts to create limited liability interstate firms. Indeed,
some post-CTS cases have invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds antitakeover statutes that ap-
plied to foreign corporations. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989);
Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (Ist Cir. 1988); Campeau Corp. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ohio 1988). For some modern examples of the large literature
bearing on constitutional constraints on application of forum rules, see Symposium: Choice-of-Law
Theory After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HoFSRA L. REV. 1 (1981); Harold W. Horowitz,
The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806
(1971); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976); James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976).
46. See Ribstein, supra note 18, at 112-13.
47. Id. at 113-14.
48. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 304 (1985) (providing for liability of
persons who invest in a business erroneously believing it is a limited partnership); REVISED MODEL
BusINESS CORP. AcT § 2.04 (1984) (providing for liability of persons purporting to act for a corpo-
ration they knew had not been formed); Ribstein, supra note 18, at 121-24 (criticizing liability on
this ground).
49. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to 913 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401 to
608.471 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to 7651 (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
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their participation in control, recognition of LLCs formed in other juris-
dictions, and freedom from other restrictions on form of governance."
After a tortuous history, the I.R.S. decided in 1988 to classify a Wyo-
ming LLC as a partnership for tax purposes.51 The Service's imprimatur
on limited liability companies indirectly may have solved the other prin-
cipal impediment to flexible, noncorporate limited liability companies.
Because the tax ruling has spurred rapid legislative activity in several
states, the problem of interstate acceptance of limited liability compa-
nies52 is being solved rapidly.
The advent of the LLC means that many of the restrictions that for-
merly hampered adoption of limited liability are disappearing. Although
many impediments remain, 3 the reduction in the tax and regulatory
costs of limited liability still provides an opportunity to test firms' prefer-
ence for limited liability in the absence of regulatory and tax
constraints. 4
§§ 86.010-86.571 (1991); TEX. H.B. 278, § 46; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to 156 (Supp. 1991);
VA. CODE §§ 13.1-1000 to 13.1-1069 (Michie Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to 136 (1977).
50. For a detailed discussion and comparison of LLC statutes, see Robert R. Keatinge et al.,
The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. (forthcoming 1992).
51. Wyoming LLCs were first determined in an I.R.S. private letter ruling to be partnerships.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980); Frank M. Burke, Jr. & John S. Sessions, The Wyo-
ming Limited Liability Company: An Alternative to Sub S and Limited Partnerships?, 54 J. TAx'N
232, 234 (1981). But a day earlier the I.R.S. had issued proposed regulations treating LLCs as
corporations. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980). Although the Service later withdrew the regulations
(see I.R.S. News Release IR-82-145 (December 16, 1982); I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B.
30 (Jan. 14, 1983)), it issued a private letter ruling classifying an LLC as a corporation (Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982)) and decided that it would not issue additional private rulings con-
cerning LLC classification (see Rev. Proc. 83-15, 1983-1 C.B. 676). In 1988 the I.R.S. deleted this
rule (Rev. Proc. 88-44, 1988-2 C.B. 634) and, finally, issued a revenue ruling finding a Wyoming
LLC to be a partnership for tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 361. See Gazer & Goff,
supra note 36, at 444-45.
It is beyond the scope of this article to develop a political theory of why tax barriers to limited
liability without incorporation only now are being lowered. However, it seems likely that pressure
for such a decision increased with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, when for the first time top corporate
tax rates rose above top individual rates, the lower tax on "capital gains" was eliminated and, be-
cause of the repeal of General Utilities, corporations no longer could avoid corporate-level recogni-
tion of gain on assets they sold or distributed to shareholders.
52. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
53. See infra Subpart IV(B) (discussing the costs of complying with the tax classification fac-
tors) and infra text accompanying notes 246-47 (discussing how tax rules effectively limit pass-
through treatment to closely held firms).
54. The evidence so far indicates significant but not overwhelming interest in this new statutory
form. Information from the secretaries of state of six of the eight states that have enacted LLC
statutes shows that approximately 1000 LLCs had formed in those states as of October 7, 1991.
Three of the statutes had been effective only since July 1, 1991, and another since July 1, 1990.
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II. SURVIVAL OF VOLUNTARY UNLIMITED LIABILITY
Most firms that now organize as general partnerships probably will not
continue to do so once restrictions on limited liability have been loosened
through recognition of the LLC form. For most such firms, cost savings
under limited liability are likely to outweigh any additional cost of credit
as compared with unlimited liability. Section A deals with non-profes-
sional firms, while Section B discusses the special case of professional
firms.
A. Non-Professional Firms
A firm's owners would elect to accept unlimited liability only if their
costs of doing so were less than their savings in credit costs. The higher
credit costs under limited liability reflect the potential agency costs credi-
tors bear. In a highly leveraged firm, limited liability owners receive all
the benefits from success while creditors bear most of the cost of failure.
As a result, owners may make investments that are excessively risky
from the creditors' standpoint" and thus fail to exercise the amount of
care creditors would prefer in monitoring and selecting the firm's
agents.56 Limited liability owners who do not "cheat," but who cannot
cheaply signal and bond their intention not to do so and who do not gain
other advantages from limited liability, may end up paying more in in-
creased credit charges than they gain from not having to bear all losses.
Whether this is actually the case depends on the advantages of limited
liability to the firm and the advantages of unlimited liability to creditors.
The advantages of limited liability may be worth the increased credit
costs in publicly traded firms because, as many writers have pointed out,
limited liability facilitates transferability of shares and therefore makes
55. See Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30
U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 143-45 (1980); Susan Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm,
141 J. INSTrrUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 601, 606 (1985); Ribstein, supra note 18, at 97-98.
56. See Ribstein, supra note 18, at 97. There is a logically prior question as to whether vicari-
ous liability of the firm for agent's acts is appropriate. Vicarious liability may be justified (subject
largely to considerations of risk sharing and the transaction costs of loss shifting) when the agent's
incentives to exercise care are diluted by her potential insolvency and when the principal is in a
better position than the third party to monitor, motivate or select agents. See Lewis A. Kornhauser,
An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 1345 (1982); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231
(1984).
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efficient securities markets possible.57
Because these trading-market advantages are not important in closely
held firms, it is tempting to conclude that most such firms would not
adopt limited liability if they internalized all costs. This conclusion
would be significant in the present context, since the increased availabil-
ity of limited liability through LLCs is likely to affect mostly closely held
firms."8 There are, however, several reasons to conclude that limited lia-
bility is attractive for closely held firms.
First, even in closely held firms, limited liability may reduce owners'
risk-bearing and monitoring costs. 59 Second, even if the advantages of
limited liability in closely held firms are small, its costs to closely held
firms in terms of the cost of credit may be even smaller. Creditors' bene-
fits from unlimited liability depend on a comparison of the expected
value (V) of debt under each rule. V turns on the creditor's ex ante eval-
uation of (1) the probability that the firm's wealth will be dissipated or
transferred out of reach before collection; (2) the probability that the
owners' wealth will be dissipated or transferred out of reach prior to the
time of collection; (3) creditor monitoring costs; and (4) collection costs.
To illustrate the comparison, assume Creditor plans to loan fifty dol-
lars to Debtor, and that Debtor can adopt either limited liability (VI) or
unlimited liability (Vu). At the time of the loan, Creditor might make
different estimates of V, and Vu based on the different collection out-
comes that variations in the above factors might produce and on the
probability (P) of each outcome. Possible outcomes under limited liabil-
ity include a twenty percent chance that Debtor will pay the entire debt,
a similar possibility that Debtor will pay only sixty percent of the debt,
and a twenty percent chance that Debtor will pay the entire debt, but
only if Creditor incurs ten dollars in collection and monitoring costs.
Under unlimited liability the probabilities may be weighted toward a
higher net collection. Creditor's interest charge may reflect, among other
things, the difference between V, and Vu. ° The expected collection out-
57. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHi. L. REV. 89, 96 (1985); Woodward, supra note 55, at 602; Ribstein, supra note 18, at 99-100.
58. This follows from the fact that LLCs, to obtain partnership tax treatment and limited liabil-
ity, will have to adopt partnership-type features of decentralized management, dissolution at will,
and restricted transferability that are suited to closely held firms. See generally Section IV(B) infra.
59. See Ribstein, supra note 18, at 101-06.
60. It will also reflect the time value of money, inflation and risk (that is, variance of expected
values around the mean). The first two factors will not differ according to whether liability is lim-
ited. It is not clear that risk, as distinguished from expected value, will differ much. In any event,
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comes (C) (net of costs, ignoring interest charges and the time value of
money), together with the probabilities (P) for each outcome might look
as follows:
V, VU
P C P C
.20 X 50 = 10 .40 X 50 =20
.20 X 40 = 8 .30 X 40 = 12
.30 X 30 = 9 .20 x 30 = 6
.30 X 20 = 6 .10 X 20 = 2
33 40
It is important to note at the outset that, for small debts, creditors are
unlikely to see a significant difference between V, and Vu. First, informa-
tion about P and C is costly.61 Thus, lenders of small amounts are likely
to conclude that any possible difference between V, and Vu is insufficient
to justify further investigation. A broad market for particular products
and services, including analysts and many comparison shoppers, may
eliminate the need for investigation by individual consumers.6' But this
sort of market may not exist for smaller firms providing non-standard-
ized services. Second, for small debts the additional collection costs to
pursue owners' wealth under individual liability will be large compared
to the amount of the debt. This reduces the small creditor's chance of
recovering more under unlimited liability than under limited liability.
Accordingly, credit charges for small debts probably will not vary signifi-
cantly in relation to whether the firm has adopted limited liability.
Even for large debts, creditors may conclude that V, and Vu are not
significantly different. The difference turns on such factors as the nature
of the firm and its owners, and the firm's ability to offer protection
against insolvency risk with and without limited liability. For example,
the loan may be made primarily against millions of dollars of "hard"
assets, such as raw land or buildings. The creditors may obtain contrac-
tual protection against sale or dissipation of these assets. Moreover,
these assets can be redeployed following bankruptcy without significant
creditors may be able to eliminate any differences in unsystematic (firm-specific) risk by diversifying
their loan portfolios, and thus may not reflect these differences in their credit charges.
61. For the seminal work on information costs and the decision to invest in search, see George
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 213 (1961). The owners can reduce the
range and the creditor's investigation costs by signalling or bonding the firm's and owners' wealth.
62. See infra text accompanying note 108.
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loss of value. 63 Thus, a limited liability debt of this firm may have a V,
that is relatively high in relation to the amount of the debt. At the same
time, V,, may not be much larger because the owners' personal assets are
small compared to those of the firm. Indeed, V, may even be lower than
V1 if the increased owner liability risk means that the firm is unable to
attract competent owner managers who will maximize the value of the
firm's assets for both owners and creditors.
Conversely, a firm with a relatively low V1 may not be able signifi-
cantly to reduce its cost of credit by offering unlimited liability because
its Vu is not much higher. For example, the firm may be owned by mini-
mally capitalized corporations, by individuals with highly liquid financial
assets that are costly to monitor, or by a sole proprietor whose wealth is
completely invested in the firm. Moreover, Vu is significantly affected by
collection costs. Contract creditors in many states cannot collect from
partners' personal assets without both suing and serving all of the part-
ners individually" and exhausting collection efforts against the partner-
ship assets. 65 This may mean delay and costly proceedings in far-flung
63. See Oliver E. Williamson, Mergers, Acquisitions and Leveraged Buyouts: An Efficiency As-
sessment, reprinted in CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1 (Lucian A. Bebchuk ed.,
1990) (suggesting that this sort of firm is appropriate for a leveraged buyout).
64. See Mansour v. Massey, 336 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1985); 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTIN, supra note
27, § 5.68.
65. Exhaustion is required if the liability is joint, as it is for the partnership's contract liabilities
under the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15(b) (1914). See Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook &
Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 271 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Illinois law); Commonwealth
Capital Inv. Corp. v. McElmurry, 302 N.W.2d 222, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Diamond Nat'l
Corp. v. Thunderbird Hotel, Inc., 454 P.2d 13 (Nev. 1969). Forjoint and several liability, which the
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15(a) imposes for partners' wrongful acts, the traditional rule is that
the liability is individual and may be enforced without exhaustion. See Foster v. Daon Corp., 713
F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Texas law); Head v. Vulcan Painters, Inc., 541 So. 2d 11
(Ala. 1989); Head v. Henry Tyler Constr. Corp., 539 So. 2d 196, (Ala. 1988); Catalina Mortgage Co.
v. Monier, 800 P.2d 574 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215, 210 A.2d 743 (Md.
1965).
There may be a general move toward an across-the-board exhaustion requirement. See REVISED
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 307(c) (Draft August 1991) (adopting exhaustion for all partnership
liabilities); UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated
Business Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act be Revised? 43 Bus. LAW 121, 143
(1987) ("this result.. .[is] most consistent with general business expectations today"). Some factors
driving the law in this direction include the entity nature of liability under the Uniform Partnership
Act, which requires application of partnership property to pay liabilities, and partner contributions
to make up any shortfall (see UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 40(a), (c), (d) (1914)); the bankruptcy
provision that lets the trustee pursue general partners only if partnership assets are insufficient (see
I I U.S.C. § 723 (1988)); and the move in some states toward joint and several liability for all part-
nership liabilities, which blurs the distinction between the exhaustion and nonexhaustion categories
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/9
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jurisdictions. These costs are increased further by the costs and uncer-
tainty of bankruptcy, 66 particularly if the creditor must use a fraudulent
conveyance remedy to pursue assets transferred by individual partners.
The extra "cushion" afforded by unlimited liability may be a very small
net of these collection CoSts.
67
Even if Vu exceeds VI, the firm nevertheless may adopt limited liability
if it obtains benefits from doing so, such as freely tradeable shares, that
outweigh the increased credit costs. Moreover, even parties that prefer
personal liability may choose to do so through individual guarantees
rather than the form of personal liability that partnership law provides.68
(see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-15 (Michie 1989)). For a general discussion of the exhaustion
requirement, see 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 5.08(d)-(g).
A move toward an across-the-board exhaustion requirement might itself be explained by consider-
ations similar to those that drive firms toward limited liability: creditors' costs of investigating part-
ner assets make the remedy less of a benefit to creditors than is direct exposure to liability coupled
with costly indemnification a cost to partners.
Note that the proposed changes to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act exacerbate a partnership's
creditors' problems not only by impeding recovery from individual partners, but also by eliminating
the automatic carryover of liabilities from a dissolved firm to a partnership that continues the busi-
ness. See REv. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 604 and Comment (1991 Draft).
66. This is indicated by a recent bankruptcy settlement of the former law firm of Myerson &
Kuhn. The partners contributed in a range only between 50-100% of their assets, giving creditors
only 22% of their claims. The settlement protects the partners not only against suits by parties to
the proceeding, but also from later suits against them personally. See Legal Beat, WALL ST. J., Oct.
2, 1991, at B5.
67. A recent article casts some doubt on this conclusion by showing that double liability of
bank shareholders, which flourished before the Depression but was quickly dismantled afterward,
was somewhat successful in effecting substantial collections, minimizing bank failures and creditor
losses, and reducing banks' capital requirements. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Double Liability of Bank Shareholders." History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forth-
coming 1992). Macey & Miller do not show whether the banks' reduction in credit costs offset the
significant costs of this system, including litigation and reduced transferability of shares. Moreover,
this system was mandated by federal and state statutes, and it is not clear whether there was an
effective state competition for bank charters that would have produced a "race to the top" of con-
tract terms. Thus, it is impossible to conclude whether banks would have adopted this system
voluntarily.
68. Note that current tax rules may discourage use of guarantees by LLCs and other limited
liability firms treated as tax partnerships. In a standard-form partnership, all partners bear the
economic risk of loss of partnership debts, and, accordingly, their tax bases for purposes of measur-
ing deductibility of losses include the amount of the debt. See I.R.C. § 752 (1980); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-IT(a) (1991). An LLC's debts normally would be nonrecourse since members are not indi-
vidually liable. Under rules regarding nonrecourse liabilities, all members take a share of the tax
benefit into basis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-IT(a)(2) (1991). But if some of the LLC's members
guarantee debts, this converts the debts to recourse, and only the guaranteeing members can add the
amount of the debt to their basis even if the firm repays the entire debt (and therefore the members
actually share the economic burden). Thus, all members have the incentive either to share in the
guarantee or to make the debts nonrecourse. See Gazur & Goff, supra note 36, at 466. In light of
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Creditors can obtain guarantees from the wealthiest partners, who most
likely would be creditors' targets even if all partners were liable. While
individual guarantees entail extra contracting costs, these costs may be
outweighed by the advantages to the parties of guarantees compared with
joint and several liability. For partners, limited liability at the firm level,
coupled with individual partner guarantees, avoids exposure to liabilities
contracted by co-partners69 and lingering partnership liability for debts
contracted after the partner's withdrawal.70 Both rules impose signifi-
cant risk-bearing and monitoring costs on partners. 71 At the same time,
creditors holding guarantees may get the benefit of reduced collection
costs by avoiding strict partnership-type exhaustion requirements.72
Limited liability coupled with guarantees also offers a better opportu-
nity for firms to differentiate among creditors than does unlimited liabil-
ity coupled with nonrecourse contracts. Jointly and severally liable
partners must incur the costs of personal liability to all creditors, includ-
ing creditors whose debts are too small to incur either the investigation
and collection costs that would justify lower credit charges for unlimited
liability73 or the transaction costs of contracting for nonrecourse liability.
the importance of member guarantees in LLCs discussed in the text, this rule operates perversely
and therefore may need to be revised.
69. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(1) (1914) (partnership bound for all debts contracted
by partners that are "apparently usual" for business). Note that even restrictions on authority in the
agreement or certificate may not be binding. For a discussion of the standards applied concerning
whether the third party is bound by statements in the partnership agreement, see 1 BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 4.02(c).
70. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 35 (1914) (partner liable for post-dissolution debts to
creditors who have not received notice of dissolution). See also Arno Management Corp. v. 115 E.
69th Street Assoc., 569 N.Y.S.2d 656 (App. Div. 1991) (general partner liable for post-withdrawal
debts even as to party who knew of withdrawal when the certificate was not amended as required by
statute).
71. One commentator suggests that an unlimited liability regime causes firms to substitute part-
ner-level for firm-level debt to help members to control the total amount of debt for which they are
responsible. See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 1565, 1590-95 (1991). Leebron concludes that this is a problem because it would cause credi-
tors of shareholders to duplicate the costs of investigating the value of the firm's assets offered by
shareholders as security, as compared with a single investigation for firm-level debt. But duplication
of investigation costs is not necessarily a problem, since shareholders could join to borrow on an
individual basis but in a single transaction. The real problem is that, even if partners themselves
borrow, they are also potentially exposed to personal liability for additional apparently authorized
firm-level debt. That is why the partners would prefer a rule barring personal liability for firm-level
debts.
72. See Thriftway Lumber Co. v. Tisherman, 672 P.2d 236 (Idaho 1983) (judgment allowed
only against partner found to have agreed to pay entire partnership debt).
73. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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Conversely, limited liability owners could contract for personal liability
only with respect to larger debts that could support customized deals. In
short, even if some firms would contract for unlimited liability, limited
liability is a superior default rule.
B. Professional Firms
Professional firms are an important category of general partnerships
and potentially important users of the LLC form. Because several states'
professional corporation acts do not let professionals obtain limited lia-
bility for acts of co-professionals,74 recognition of LLCs for professional
firms might eliminate an important barrier to limited liability that does
not exist for non-professional firms.75
Professional firms' debts to trade creditors seem to adhere to a
straightforward application of the above analysis when Vu greatly ex-
ceeds VI because the partners' combined assets ordinarily greatly exceed
the firms' marketable assets. In this situation, unlimited liability seem-
ingly would offer a valuable bond that significantly reduces the firms'
cost of credit.76
The comparison between Vu and VI is, however, complicated in profes-
sional firms because the firms are creditors at the beginning of the rela-
74. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS 117-28 (1990 & Supp.) (reviewing stat-
utes); Laura R. Brown, Comment, Limited Liability for Shareholders in Virginia Professional Corpo-
rations: Fact or Fiction?, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 571 (1987); Carolyn M.C. Komyati, Note,
Professional Legal Corporations: Limited or Unlimited Liability for Shareholders in Missouri After
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria? 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 297 (1984). None of the statutes permit
limited liability for the professionals' own acts. Indeed, such a limitation of liability would violate
ethical rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102, EC 6-6 (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(i) (1983).
75. The extent to which LLCs will be approved for this purpose is unclear. Many of the stat-
utes are silent on use by professional firms. The Virginia statute precludes use by professionals. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1008 (Michie Supp. 1991). The Colorado statute forbids an LLC from con-
ducting any business that is forbidden to limited partnerships. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-103
(Supp. 1990). Moreover, the Colorado statute is inappropriate for professional firms because it man-
dates centralized management. See id. § 7-80-401. On the other hand, Utah and Kansas explicitly
permit use by professionals. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-105(l)(r) (Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 7-7604(q) (Supp. 1990). Moreover, even if LLCs are approved for professional firms, the
courts still may not limit liability for co-partner torts. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
76. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. L.
& ECON. 327, 336-37 (1983). Indeed, even partners often offer personal guarantees to creditors. See
Sharon Walsh, Landlord Sues Law Firm for $1.2 Million in Rent, WASH. POST, July 5, 1991, at CIO
(individual partners of failed law firm being sued for liability on lease they guaranteed; commercial
real estate creditor quoted as saying "You cannot get a proposal for a law firm in this town right now
without the signatures of the partners-and sometimes their spouses.").
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tionship and only become debtors as a result of any subsequent
malpractice.77 Accordingly, the client or patient, in fixing the cost of
"credit," must assess the probability that any debt will arise. That, in
turn, depends on whether the professionals will "chisel" the client or
patient by delivering less than the promised degree of service. Even in a
limited liability firm, the professional is liable for his or her own negli-
gence. Thus, choosing between limited and unlimited liability in profes-
sional firms, in the absence of tax and regulatory constraints, involves a
tradeoff between the costs to professionals and benefits to clients of moni-
toring by co-professionals.
Jack Carr and Frank Mathewson recently have shown how general
partnership can be an efficient contract for firms in which monitoring is
valuable for clients because holding monitors personally liable makes it
costly for professionals to "bribe" them.78 This suggests that even if lim-
ited liability is fully available for professional firms, some will remain
general partnerships because clients may be willing to pay extra fees in
order to ensure effective monitoring.
In an earlier article, Carr and Mathewson had argued that mandatory
unlimited liability raises the cost of capital for professional firms gener-
ally, and therefore makes them inefficiently small. Capital costs increase
because partners must invest resources in monitoring their co-partners'
wealth and performance to ensure that they will not chisel clients and
then free-ride on the wealthier partners' ability to pay the uninsured por-
tion of malpractice judgments.79
The question the Carr-Mathewson articles pose is whether clients' fees
would increase enough to offset these higher capital costs. This calls for
an analysis of the expected value to the client of the firm's services under
limited and unlimited liability, taking into account the possibility of un-
collectible malpractice judgments. There are several reasons clients are
unlikely to insist on significant fee discounts for limited liability profes-
sional firms.
First, even a limited liability firm has significant assets at stake. These
77. By contrast, non-professional firms' liability to voluntary creditors, with the important ex-
ception of product liability claims, usually involves a debt the existence and often amount of which is
known at the onset of the relationship.
78. See Jack L. Carr & G. Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the
Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J. L. & ECON. 307, 321-22 (1990). Presumably the bribe could be
in the form of receiving a share of the extra net income the co-partner produces for the firm.
79. See Jack L. Carr & G. Frank Mathewson, Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry, 96 J.
POL. ECON. 766, 779 (1988).
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include the marketable assets of the firm, which is generally vicariously
liable for the malpractice of its members,80 of the primarily liable mem-
ber, and of all other members whose negligence contributed to the loss. 81
Since the members can be expected to have substantial assets, they have
incentives to purchase third-party malpractice insurance and to monitor
co-partners to minimize their premiums and protect against liability be-
yond policy limits and within coinsurance and deductibles.
Second, the firm stands to forfeit some of its reputation in the event of
member malpractice. Although injured clients cannot recover against
goodwill, the firm invests resources in developing its reputation, and this
stake gives it an incentive to minimize malpractice.82
Third, even if unlimited liability does increase members' exposure to
malpractice claims, this increased exposure may not provide significant
benefits to the client. Although lawyers may have some additional incen-
tive under unlimited liability to monitor co-partners, this increased moni-
toring may not be particularly useful, indeed may be counterproductive,
to the extent that it involves second guessing complex professional deci-
sions. On the other hand, the clients themselves effectively can monitor
their own cases through corporate legal departments, general practition-
ers who review the work of medical specialists, and, in the United King-
dom, by solicitors who employ barristers to try cases. 8
3
The move to limited liability for professional firms over the thirty
years since adoption of the first professional corporation act seems to
provide an opportunity to test the proposition that most professional
firms would prefer unconstrained limited liability. Carr and Mathewson
show that law firms have higher average receipts and more income per
lawyer in states permitting limited liability.8" They attribute the higher
income to larger firms' handling more complex cases that require better,
and therefore more highly paid, legal talent. This data seem to support
80. See Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 337 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1959) (medical malpractice); McVaney v. Baird,
Holm, McEachen, Pedersen, Hamann & Strasheim, 466 N.W.2d 499 (Neb. 1991) (legal malprac-
tice); I BROMBERG & RiBSTrEIN, supra note 27, § 4.07(b).
81. See Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 466 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1971) (triable issue as to
whether medical partnership breached duty to use reasonable means to prevent partner from im-
properly using his position in personal relationship with patient).
82. On the role of reputational bonds generally see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The
Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
83. See Carr & Mathewson, supra note 78, at 322.
84. See Carr & Mathewson, supra note 79, at 780-83.
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their thesis that unlimited liability increases larger firms' capital costs,
and therefore constrains law-firm size.
Ronald Gilson argues that the move to incorporation for larger firms
and wealthier lawyers is actually attributable to the fact that, before
1982, corporations, but not partnerships, could deduct pension pay-
ments, a tax break worth more to higher-income lawyers.8 5 In other
words, firms do not have higher income because they can incorporate,
but rather they incorporate because they have higher income. Carr and
Mathewson respond that, even if larger firms incorporate for tax reasons,
this would not explain why the average size of all firms would be larger
in states adopting limited liability, unless the presence of many large law
firms in a state was a factor in the move toward limited liability. 6 Gil-
son notes that a re-examination of Carr and Mathewson's data showed
"no significant relationship between extent of liability protection and in-
corporation.""7 Gilson suggests testing Carr and Mathewson's hypothe-
sis by looking at post-1982 data, or at professional sole-proprietorship
corporations, which do not insulate the sole owner from personal liability
and therefore must be used only for tax purposes.
Even if Carr and Mathewson correctly conclude that their data show
that mandatory unlimited liability artificially restricts law-firm size, their
data are still inconsistent with the theory in this Article because they
show that many firms choose unlimited liability even when they have a
choice. Gilson's response not only refutes Carr and Mathewson, but also
casts further doubt on the thesis presented here by contending that there
is no correlation between the availability of limited liability and the move
to incorporate.
Both conclusions, however, can be reconciled with the death-of-part-
nership thesis. First, under current law there is no limited liability for
professional corporations under many state statutes,88 and even under
statutes that seem to allow limited liability for co-members' acts, the
courts may compel unlimited liability by judicial rule. 9
Second, Carr and Mathewson and Gilson ignore the critical factor that
85. See Ronald J. Gilson, Unlimited Liability and Law Firm Organization: Tax Factors and the
Direction of Causation, 99 J. POL. ECON. 420 (1991).
86. Jack L. Carr & G. Frank Mathewson, Reply to Professor Gilson, 99 J. POL. ECON. 426
(1991).
87. See Gilson, supra note 85, at 424.
88. See HILLMAN, supra note 74, at 120.
89. See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983) (court can determine, as
a matter of its regulation of the bar rather than interpretation of the statute, that lawyers cannot
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the partnership form enables a professional firm to avoid double tax on
any income it is unable to distribute as deductible salaries.90 That is par-
ticularly true for large law firms too big to meet the thirty-five-share-
holder restriction for Subchapter S Corporations, and whose associates
generate significant income for partners.91 One piece of evidence sup-
ports the importance of this factor: S Corporation filings increased be-
ginning in 198792 when a non-graduated thirty-four percent tax on
personal service corporations replaced a graduated tax that had begun at
fifteen percent.93 Apparently, firms that formerly could distribute all but
an amount that would qualify for the lowest tax rate no longer were will-
ing to pay the higher flat tax on the same amount. In other words, at the
margin, the double corporate tax is a problem for professional firms. In-
deed, the data are, if anything, biased against this result because the S
Corporation election forces firms to recognize unrealized gain.
Thus, until the tax distinction based on limited liability is eliminated, it
will not be clear whether the many professional firms that remain part-
nerships do so for tax reasons or because clients are willing to pay
enough for unlimited liability to offset its costs to partners.
limit their liability for co-partners' acts); HILLMAN, supra note 74, at 121-28; Brown, supra note 74;
Komyati, supra note 74.
This unpredictability of limited liability may make it fruitless to apply an empirical test of the
benefit of unlimited liability suggested to me by Ian Ayres: comparing malpractice insurance rates in
states with and without limited liability.
90. See Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Use of Corporations by Persons Who Perform Services to Gain
Tax Advantages, 57 TAXES 797, 809 (1979) (questioning whether entire amount of contingent fee
could be paid out to lawyers as reasonable compensation); Howard Chapman, The Future of Per-
sonal Service Corporations, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 503, 526 (1982) (noting reasonable compensation
problem).
91. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming ofAge in a Corporate Law Firm: The
Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1989). In this situation, payments to
partners may bear little resemblance to wages because they are not directly attributable to partner
efforts. (That is not to suggest, however, that the compensation characterization ultimately depends
on whether the income is directly attributable to partner efforts.)
Professional firms cannot obtain limited liability by organizing as limited partnerships, because the
members' participation in control would run afoul of the "control rule." REVISED UNIFORM LTD.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303 (1985).
92. S Corporation filings increased from 724,749 in 1985 to 1,127,905 in 1987 and 1,127,191 in
1988. See 11 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF
INCOME, Summer 1991, at 125.
93. See I.R.C. § 1 l(b)(2) (1988) (tax applies to "qualified personal service corporation," defined
in id. § 448(d)(2) to include law, accounting, and other professional finns).
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C. Summary
The foregoing analysis suggests that, were tax and regulatory impedi-
ments to limited liability removed, unlimited liability would be valuable
only for firms that meet the following combination of criteria:
(1) Reduced benefits from limited liability because of such features as
decentralized management and restricted transferability;94
(2) individual debts large enough to justify lower interest charges for
unlimited than for limited liability; and
(3) small-firm capitalization coupled with significant owner wealth or
other characteristics justifying a higher interest charge under limited
liability.
Some firms, such as professional firms (with respect to non-client cred-
itors), meet all three criteria. However, in a world in which limited liabil-
ity is not penalized, even these firms probably would prefer limited
liability coupled with personal guarantees for some debts to joint and
several liability to all creditors. In short, if firms were free to choose
organizational form without tax or regulatory constraints, the partner-
ship form (in the sense of a business form whose members are personally
liable for the firm's debts) would not survive.
III. PROTECTING INVOLUNTARY CREDITORS
The analysis in Section II indicates that, while the partnership form
would not survive deregulation of limited liability, individual liability
may be efficient in some firms for some debts. But some such firms might
adopt across-the-board limited liability in order to externalize costs to
involuntary, or "tort," creditors.95 Potential externalities regarding tort
creditors might justify regulating or taxing limited liability. Indeed,
some commentators question the propriety of permitting unlimited liabil-
94. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59 (noting increased advantages of limited liability
for publicly traded firms that separate ownership and control).
95. "Tort" refers at least to creditors who do not deal intentionally with the firm before the
claim arises. The category arguably also should include some voluntary creditors, such as ordinary
consumers, who reasonably cannot be expected to contract to be paid for the extra risks of limited
liability.
Saul Levmore suggests that firms may switch "midstream" from partnership to LLC form in
order to escape claims to creditors. See Levmore, supra note 17, at 491. However, since partners
need creditors' agreement to discharge liabilities (see UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 36 (1914)), it is
hard to see what partners can gain from midstream conversion to LLC form. It is even harder to see
what partners gain from partnership-LLC conversions over what they already can accomplish by
incorporating.
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ity in tort cases9 6 or suggest abolishing limited liability in some
situations.97
This Section shows, however, that the potential for externalities may
be less than has been supposed. The purpose of this Section is not to
make a convincing case against unlimited tort liability; that must await a
much longer discussion. Rather, this Section highlights the flaws in the
case for unlimited tort liability and suggests caution in mandating unlim-
ited liability. In particular, this Section shows that protecting tort credi-
tors does not justify restricting the development of LLCs.
Subsections A and B discuss both the significant costs of imposing un-
limited tort liability on shareholders, which have been well recognized by
commentators, and the dubious benefits, which commentators have over-
stated. Subsection C shows that limited tort liability is well entrenched
in the courts, thus casting doubt on the desirability of major changes in
the opposite direction. Finally, Subsection D points out that, even if lim-
ited tort liability is undesirable, it is inappropriate to protect tort credi-
tors by restricting the availability of the LLC form.
A. Limited Liability and Externalization of Tort Risk
The effect of limited tort liability depends on the availability of insur-
ance. To the extent that the firm can obtain third-party insurance
against tort liability, unlimited liability simply forces the personally liable
members of the firm to cause the firm to buy such insurance.9" On the
other hand, limited liability lets even fully insurable firms choose not to
bear the cost of insurance and thereby transfer tort risks to victims.9 9 If
assets and insurance are insufficient to cover tort risks, owners may make
96. See Leebron, supra note 71.
97. See Halpern, supra note 55; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Alan Schwartz, Product Lia-
bility, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985) (suggesting unlimited liability if assets and insurance insufficient to
satisfy knowable tort claims).
98. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 47-49 (1991) (noting that limited liability is much less important now than it was
when insurance markets were less developed); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 868-76 (1984) (discussing personal liability of
managers as a solution to the problem of asset insufficiency, assuming full availability of insurance).
99. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 98, at 50; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 175-76 (1987); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 97; Christopher D.
Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 65-76
(1980); Leebron, supra note 71, at 1584-87; Schwartz, supra note 97, at 711-17.
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decisions on investments in assets, projects, or precautions that, while
privately optimal for the owners, are socially suboptimal. 'I Involuntary
creditors, by definition, are not compensated for bearing these increased
risks.
The foregoing argument for unlimited liability depends on two critical
points discussed in this Section. First, Subsections (1) and (2) question
how much difference there really is in owners' incentives to insure and
capitalize under limited liability and under unlimited liability. Second,
as discussed in Subsection (3), any additional incentive for the firm to
insure under unlimited tort liability is inefficient to the extent that tort
liability itself is inappropriate-that is, when the firm is in a relatively
poor position to insure or protect against the loss.
1. Owners' Incentives to Capitalize and Insure under Limited
Liability
The critics of limited tort liability assume that under-insurance and
under-capitalization are serious problems. But the factors discussed be-
low indicate that these problems often do not exist, even in many very
closely held limited liability firms.101
a. Protecting Owners
Limited liability does not insulate tortfeasors themselves from liability,
but merely prevents liability solely by virtue of ownership status. In the
most closely held firms, in which under-capitalization is the greatest
problem, owners may have sufficiently participated in the tort, either as
100. For various expressions of this general point, see KoSE JOHN & LEMMA W. SENBET, LIM-
ITED LIABILITY, TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF CORPORATE DEBT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8-9 (New York
University School of Business Working Paper No. 544, 1989) (copy on file with author) (formal
model showing that risky investment under limited liability will be higher than what is socially
optimal); Kraakman, supra note 98, at 874 n.45 (limited tort liability enables owners to increase the
value of their interests under an option pricing model); Leebron, supra note 71, at 1570-74 (private
expected value may be higher, and the private risk lower, than the social expected value and risk).
101. It is in this context that the availability of limited liability is expanding through LLCs, and
that the dominant role of general partnerships is threatened. At the same time, some commentators
have suggested that it is here that limited tort liability is most troublesome in terms of the possibility
of externalization. See SHAVELL, supra note 99, at 176; Leebron, supra note 71, at 1626-30.
Professor Hillman argues that I fail to establish that externalization of risk is not a problem for
closely held firms. See Robert W. Hillman, Of .4rsenic, Old Lace, and Dancing on Coffins: 4 Com-
ment on the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 470 (1992). That is true. My goal is only to
show that externalization is not as serious a problem as has been supposed. Although my theory
lacks empirical support, the burden is on those who advocate restricting private ordering to show
that there is a problem and that their suggested restrictions are appropriate solutions.
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direct actors or as negligent monitors to be held directly liable. 102 The
victim may sue the owner-tortfeasor directly, or the liability may circle
back from the firm to the owner through indemnification. Because of
this risk of personal liability, owners in very closely held firms have a
significant incentive to insure against tort liability.
b. Protecting Assets
The owners may have the incentive to insure in order to protect their
own investments in the firm's assets from tort creditors. The owners
could, of course, avoid this problem simply by placing ownership of as-
sets in other hands. However, if the firm does not itself own certain as-
sets, it must contract for their use. This may expose the firm to post-
contractual opportunism by the asset owners. 103 Leases and other con-
tracts that attempt to avoid this problem are costly to negotiate and draft
and in any event leave the firm vulnerable as to rights that have not been
reserved to the firm. Moreover, it is harder for the firm to realize econo-
mies of managing common assets if the assets are owned separately. 104
c. Protecting Voluntary Creditors
Just as owners, under limited liability, cannot easily avoid responsibil-
ity for torts by minimizing the firm's assets, so they cannot easily do so
by minimizing their own equity investments and capitalizing the firm
with borrowed funds. Large creditors are in a position to investigate the
firm's assets and insist on adequate capitalization. Of course, the firm
may be able to borrow from voluntary creditors even without collateral
or insurance by having the borrowing done against nonfirm assets, as
when the owners guarantee the firm's debts. But some long-term insider
creditors (managers and employees) rely on the continued existence of
the assets assembled in the firm and therefore would be hurt by a forced
liquidation of assets. Owner guarantees will not readily protect these
people because insiders seek job protection and not merely repayment of
a specific debt. Because these voluntary creditors can adjust their terms
to reflect the firm's exposure to tort risks, the firm has the incentive to
insure and capitalize adequately to cover expected tort claims. 105 More-
102. For the analysis in the professional-firm context, see supra text accompanying note 81.
103. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
104. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 97, at 1914.
105. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 98, at 107-08. Protecting assets may be less of an
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over, the firm may need to insure as a way of assuring outsider creditors
that managers will not attempt ex post to impose risks on creditors by
engaging in risky projects or shortsightedly deferring maintenance. 10 6
A firm may need to insure or capitalize even to reassure relatively un-
sophisticated outside voluntary creditors with smaller claims. While or-
dinary consumers do not generally investigate sellers' credit or dicker
over credit terms, when a firm's ability to stand behind its products or
services is an important aspect of the transaction10 7 prices may reflect the
firm's financial stability. This is no different from the process by which
prices adjust to information about product characteristics and the terms
of guarantees if there are enough informed comparison shoppers or ana-
lysts in the market.108 Also, a sophisticated agent such as a labor union
may represent smaller creditors.10 9 And even if credit risks to consumers
are not priced in an efficient market, it does not follow that consumers
are hurt by under-pricing the risk. Consumers' high information costs
relative to the amount of their debt may cause them to seek compensa-
tion at a rate that exceeds the true cost of risk at many firms. 10 This
encourages firms to signal or bond their solvency and coverage of tort
risks, such as by investing in a brand name the value of which would be
reduced if the company could not cover its tort liabilities."'
incentive to insure and capitalize for manager-owners or professionals in very closely held firms
whose human capital is less dependent on other firm assets. But as already discussed supra at note
102, in very closely held firms owners are threatened by direct liability.
106. See David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demandfor Insurance, 55 J.
Bus. 281 (1982). Mayers & Smith offer other reasons firms may insure, including assisting larger
firms in claims administration. They also assert that closely held firms may have more incentive
than public firms to insure to protect owners' nondiversiflable investments. In a more recent article,
the authors present data showing that closely held insurance companies are more likely than widely
held companies to purchase reinsurance. See David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corpo-
rate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market, 63 J. Bus. 19 (1990).
107. This would apply, for example, to pest-control services, which enter into long-term service
and warranty contracts.
108. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979); Alan Schwartz &
Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties
and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983).
109. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 98, at 51.
110. Id. at 52; see also text accompanying notes 61-62 supra (discussing how firms' cost of bor-
rowing from such creditors may not differ significantly under limited and unlimited liability re-
gimes). Indeed, unlimited liability may be worthless for many small creditors whose collection costs
exceed the amount of the debt.
111. It is true that the company may be able to sell the brand name free of liabilities if the
company liquidates. See, e.g., Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting
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In short, under-insurance and under-capitalization are most likely to
be problems for certain categories of firms: those that can avoid owning
substantial assets, those that do not sell their products in markets in
which risks are likely to be efficiently priced, and those with large poten-
tial tort liabilities. Many of these firms can be isolated in specific indus-
tries, such as hazardous waste, and subjected to industry-specific
insurance or minimum-capital requirements. If so, the costs of general
restrictions on limited liability, such as restricting the use of LLCs, may
outweigh the benefits. That is particularly likely to be the case if, as
discussed in the next Subsection, externalization persists even under un-
limited liability.
2. Externalization under Unlimited Liability
Compelling unlimited liability may not significantly reduce externali-
zation because, as even some unlimited liability advocates have recog-
nized, shareholders can evade personal liability." 2 First, owners can
avoid the effects of liability by hiding assets or shifting them to family
members, trusts, pension funds, or the like.' 13 Second, firms could disag-
gregate by transferring assets carrying heavy tort risks to low-asset hold-
ers and capitalizing largely through debt financing.1 1 4 Firms actually
have pursued these strategies in response to the imposition of statutory
unlimited liability for environmental torts. 115
Unlimited liability, therefore, often simply changes the nature of eva-
sion rather than precluding it. Although there are private contractual
and market constraints on evasion of unlimited liability, the constraints
resemble those operating under limited liability. Just as limited liability
owners need to capitalize and insure the firm to minimize credit costs to
voluntary creditors, 6 so unlimited liability owners are under similar
"product line" theory of successor liability). But the value of the brand name nevertheless may be
reduced by the firm's inability to stand behind its products.
112. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 97, at 1909-16. This point is rebutted to some
extent by Macey & Miller's discussion of the experience with double liability of bank shareholders.
See supra note 67. However, as already noted, Macey & Miller do not establish that the benefits of
the system outweighed its significant litigation and other costs.
113. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 97, at 1885-85, 1910-11. See Sharon Walsh, Bank-
ruptcy Fraud Rises as Debtors Hide Assets, WASH. Posr, July 13, 1991, at Al.
114. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 97, at 1913-15.
115. See George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 151, 174-76 (1991) (discussing liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)).
116. See subsection III(A)(l)(c) supra.
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constraints to own and retain personal assets on which voluntary credi-
tors may rely.1 17 These constraints are admittedly imperfect. As a re-
sult, specific regulation may be appropriate to mitigate the most extreme
forms of evasion under either regime. 1 ' But regulation under unlimited
liability may need to be more costly and complex than that under limited
liability in order effectively to regulate asset transactions of individual
shareholders.
It may be harder to evade unlimited than limited liability because high
debt or subsidiarization are not complete solutions for personally liable
owners. But these greater difficulties also mean that evasion strategies
may involve greater secondary costs under unlimited liability than under
limited liability. In particular, evasion under unlimited liability means
selecting only the poorest owners, or the owners who are otherwise least
concerned about liability, rather than the best managers or monitors. It
also may mean losing significant benefits of synergy by completely sepa-
rating potentially complementary lines of business or stages of produc-
tion rather than by simply reducing economies of scale of management
through subsidiarization. These governance effects not only may have
generally perverse effects, but also may increase tort injuries by decreas-
ing management efficiency and incentives to take precautions. In short,
increasing firms' evasion costs could result in, for instance, a total of one
hundred dollars of increased tort exposure for the firms that do not
evade, but one hundred twenty-five dollars of increased tort costs for the
firms that successfully evade because of the highly risky strategies they
employ.
3. Effect of Increased Owner Liability
Even if mandatory unlimited liability did reduce firms' ability to avoid
tort liability, this may not help achieve the principal tort objectives of
loss prevention and loss distribution.
a. Loss Prevention
Even if personal liability reduces owners' ability to evade tort claims,
they can at least partly insure their liability. Accordingly, whether un-
limited liability increases loss prevention depends further on whether in-
surers can monitor and adjust premiums to reflect insureds' standard of
117. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 97, at 1913.
118. Id. at 1927-28.
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care. Unless premiums are precisely experience rated, a marginal in-
crease in insurance may not make much difference in the level of care
owners and their agents exercise.
Moreover, any additional exposure to liability may add little to own-
ers' and agents' extra-legal incentives to act carefully. For example,
managers may want to avoid moral responsibility for accidents and to
preserve their reputations for running a safe business.119 Also, agents,
such as drivers, may act carefully to protect themselves from harm.120
Assuming personal liability would increase owner precautions against
injuries, this increase may not be efficient from a loss-prevention perspec-
tive if the tort system otherwise would force firms to take excessive care.
Some tort cases impose liability for essentially unknowable risks, or for
injuries that were easily preventable by plaintiffs. Owners may not have
been able readily to reduce loss by, for example, choosing less risky
projects, hiring more careful agents, observing agents, and controlling
agents' behavior by the threat of termination and wage adjustments.1 21
Owners often cannot significantly influence agents' conduct because,
among other reasons, agents' loss-creating conduct is not cheaply observ-
able or because they work for a single period. Indeed, unlimited liability
may reduce incentives for care by deflecting the loss from agents, who are
effectively disciplined by the risk of liability, to remote owners who are
not.
Unlimited liability may, therefore, subvert tort's loss-prevention goal
by shifting liability to the least efficient cost-avoiders and producing a
higher-than-optimal level of precaution by firms. As a result, firms may
wholly avoid certain products, although consumer surplus could have
been preserved and accident costs optimized if limited liability had
shifted some of the loss-prevention burden to consumers.1 22
119. Cf. Mark Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. Rv. 1, 23-34 (1986)
(managers have reputational incentives not to avoid tort liability by liquidating).
120. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1252 (1984).
121. See SHAVELL, supra note 99, at 170-72; Lewis Kornbauser, An Economic Analysis of the
Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1345 (1982); Sykes,
supra note 56.
122. For example, it was reported recently that a cord maker turned down a potentially lucrative
business in making cords for bungee jumping because of the liability risk. See Pamela Sebastian,
Business Bulletin, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1991, at Al. Presumably, firms would be even more reluc-
tant to manufacture bungee cords if personal liability increased owners' liability exposure. On the
other hand, users presumably are aware that hooking "to elastic cords for the purpose of leaping
from precipices into thin air," id., involves some risk, and that any cord's elasticity is finite.
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b. Loss Distribution
Assuming plaintiffs and defendants have equal access to insurance, un-
limited liability might be justified irrespective of loss-prevention effects if
it encourages owners of risk-creating firms and their agents, who are pre-
sumably better aware than plaintiffs of the relevant risks, to purchase
insurance. But as George Priest explained, the problem with this insur-
ance-based loss-distribution justification for tort liability'23 is that the re-
sulting shift from first-party insurance, such as accident and worker-
compensation policies, to third-party insurance has vastly increased the
cost of insurance in relation to the expected loss.
There are several reasons insurance-based liability is inefficient. First,
the insurance rationale over-compensates some plaintiffs. When money
does not increase the victim's utility-i.e., when the victim has lost a
capacity for enjoying what money will buy-unlimited liability serves
only to decrease the injurer's utility. 24 Full compensation also involves
the moral hazard that victims may not mitigate or economize on claims,
problems that are addressed in first-party policies such as health insur-
ance through deductibles and co-insurance.' 25 Second, third-party insur-
ance involves higher collection and administrative costs, since victims
can collect only after hiring a lawyer and establishing liability under
complex and uncertain tort rules. Third, the shift to third-party liability
insurance impedes insurers' ability to reduce risk by diversification be-
cause increases in tort liability are correlated across products and
risks. 126 Fourth, third-party insurance impedes insurers' ability to sepa-
rate risks into risk pools because firms must provide insurance for con-
sumers who vary widely in risk and wealth.
Priest shows that this shift to relatively inefficient third-party insur-
ance perversely reduces the total amount of third-party insurance be-
cause of adverse selection. Once insurers no longer can offer cost-
effective risk diversification and aggregation into risk pools, lower-risk
firms will conclude that insurance is overpriced in relation to their ex-
123. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987).
124. See SHAVELL, supra note 99, at 228-29. Shavell notes that optimal deterrence can be rec-
onciled with optimal compensation by assessing the full loss against the injurer but having it paid as
a fine that either reduces taxes or is rebated to product customers. Id. at 233-35. But this assumes
that liability is appropriately based on deterrence. The point in the text is that liability based solely
on loss distribution is unjustified in this situation.
125. See Priest, supra note 123, at 1548.
126. Id. at 1562-63.
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pected loss and will self-insure. Insurers must then raise premiums and
reduce coverage of the higher-risk firms remaining in the pool, further
reducing the amount of insurance. Although mandating personal liabil-
ity would increase all firms' incentives to insure, the low-risk firms would
still have relatively less incentive to insure, and adverse selection would
persist.
The discussion so far has assumed that both owners and tort plaintiffs
can fully insure. However, because of high deductibles and co-insurance
resulting partly from the adverse selection problem, owners may have
less access to liability insurance than plaintiffs. Unlimited liability there-
fore may shift liability from an insurable plaintiff to an uninsurable de-
fendant, contrary to loss-distribution aims. This may further exacerbate
the effects of the insurance crisis by forcing firms that would otherwise
self insure to exit markets altogether.
The basic lesson of this Subsection is that, even if limited liability lets
firms avoid tort liability, the end result may be salutary rather than per-
verse because otherwise tort remedies would exceed appropriate loss pre-
vention and loss distribution. In other words, advocacy of unlimited tort
liability mistakenly assumes the efficiency of the tort system. While this
problem perhaps is best answered by reforming the tort system, the ab-
sence of such reform weakens the argument for mandatory unlimited tort
liability.
B. The Costs of Unlimited Liability
The costs of unlimited liability arise because owners, even if they have
the incentive to do so under unlimited liability, cannot purchase third-
party liability insurance against all possible tort losses. This inability
arises because insurers have incomplete information about tort risks, and
because complete insurance would create adverse selection and moral
hazard problems for insurers.' 27
The owners' inability to insure fully may result in poor loss distribu-
tion because victims may be more fully or cheaply insurable.' Other
costs have been surveyed elsewhere.129 Owners who are jointly and sev-
erally liable cannot easily diversify their portfolios because each addi-
tional investment actually increases the potential of a loss that could
127. See SHAVELL, supra note 99, at 211-12; Halpern, supra note 55, at 140-42.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
129. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24; Halpern, supra note 55; Leebron, supra note 71;
Woodward, supra note 55; Ribstein, supra note 18, at 99-107.
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reduce the value of the entire portfolio to zero. The increased risk to
owners under unlimited liability also makes it costly for owners to dele-
gate decisionmaking functions to managers without retaining a signifi-
cant monitoring role.130  And unlimited liability interferes with
transferability of shares. Increasing transferees' need for information
about the firm and the wealth of the other owners restricts owners' abil-
ity to shed their risk by transferring shares, and necessitates share-trans-
fer restrictions to protect non-transferring shareholders.
Limiting shareholders' liability to a percentage reflecting their owner-
ship interests would increase transferability, diversification, and delega-
tion of decisionmaking, but it would also induce wealthy owners to take
small equity positions in firms. This would restrict the class from which
competent managers and monitors can be drawn. Moreover, pro rata
liability involves significant logistical problems in defining and determin-
ing each owner's share of liability.131
These costs of unlimited liability are not imposed on owners who in-
vest after the unlimited liability rule goes into effect. Rather, investors
adjust what they will pay to reflect their increased risks under the new
system. This increased capital cost may decrease the size and number of
firms, 132 thereby reducing potential wealth creation by firms.
In general, it is important to keep in mind that the costs of unlimited
liability arise solely because of the circumstance of joint investment in an
unlimited liability firm. In other words, limited liability eliminates the
costs rather than simply transferring them to victims. 133
To summarize: In light of the constraints on evasion under limited
liability, the ability to evade liability under unlimited liability, the poten-
tial social cost of those evasion tactics, and the dubious benefits of any
increased exposure under unlimited liability given defects in the underly-
ing tort system, it is far from clear that unlimited liability reduces tort
costs as compared to limited liability. In any event, any such cost reduc-
130. For a discussion of this problem in the context of law firms, see supra text accompanying
note 79.
131. For example, there is a question whether the pro rata determination should be according to
total ownership, or ownership represented by the parties to a particular claim. The problem could
be eliminated by forcing plaintiffs to sue all owners, but this solution would raise litigation costs
substantially as compared with joint and several liability. See Leebron, supra note 71, at 1610-12.
132. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing data concerning law firm size that
supports this assertion).
133. See Leebron, supra note 71, at 1600.
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tion is probably less than the potential wealth loss from regulatory com-
pulsion of unlimited liability.
C. Judicial Support for Limited Tort Liability
Limited tort liability is a venerable rule long supported by the courts in
cases involving piercing the corporate veil of closely held firms. Signifi-
cantly, courts have continued to recognize limited liability even as they
lower other barriers to liability, particularly the privity limitation on
product liability claims."3 4 Robert Thompson's recent extensive survey
of approximately 1500 veil-piercing cases revealed that courts pierced the
veil in a lower percentage of tort cases than contract cases, that courts
mentioned undercapitalization in a lower percentage of tort cases (thir-
teen percent) than of contract cases (nineteen percent), and that courts
pierced the veil in only seventy tort cases altogether, of which more than
two-thirds involved corporate shareholders."5 Indeed, Thompson con-
cludes that these figures show that "piercing law is rooted in concerns of
inequitable bargains." '136
This respect for the corporate form cannot be attributed to the growth
of successor liability, as Thompson argues. 137 Some courts have resisted
the "product line" theory, 138 thereby giving companies wide latitude to
escape product liability claims by selling off chunks of the firm. Nor can
the rarity of piercing be attributed simply to respect for the corporation
statutes, since this begs the question of why the courts have declined to
extend this essentially common-law theory of liability.
Although the courts' long and deep recognition of limited liability does
not in itself establish the normative validity of limited liability, there is
arguably a strong relationship between common-law tort rules and eco-
134. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). David Leebron suggests
that restricting limited tort liability is consistent with the expansion of strict tort liability. See Leeb-
ron, supra note 71, at 1587. In fact, the direction of causation may run the other way: strict liability
has expanded because the development of limited liability ameliorated its burdens. Normatively, as
discussed in Section III(A)(3) supra, limited liability may even be a necessary antidote to the ex-
cesses of strict tort liability.
135. See Robert B. Thompson, PIercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1036 (1991). It is not clear what kinds of cases were classified as "tort" and "contract." It
seems likely that the "tort" classification included at least some cases of voluntary dealing, since the
author identified a category of "tort" cases involving misrepresentation.
136. See id. at 1068.
137. Id. at 1072.
138. See supra note 111.
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nomic efficiency. 139
D. Involuntary Creditors and Limited Liability Companies
Even if limited tort liability produced a net social loss, it still does not
follow that regulation should slow the expansion of limited liability
through LLCs. First, any externalities resulting from limited liability are
better addressed by industry-specific regulation than by a general restric-
tion on the availability of limited liability that could be readily evaded by
the worst offenders."4
Second, the restrictions on LLCs protect creditors only if these restric-
tions affect the level of the firms' precautions or their ability to pay
claims. But corporate statutes imposing a norm of centralized manage-
ment do not provide for manager liability to creditors. The only connec-
tion between management form and tort liability is that nonowner
managers are creditors of the firm and therefore are more likely to run
the firm in the creditors' than in the owners' interests. But corporate
statutes require only a board of directors and not nonowner managers.
In any event, firms readily can avoid these rules by adopting the close
corporation form. The difficulties close corporation statutes impose, par-
ticularly including filing requirements, may be inconvenient for owners,
but do nothing for involuntary creditors who do not see the filings.
The only inhibition on LLCs that might make sense in protecting tort
creditors is the tax penalty on limited liability. But as discussed in the
next Part, this approach is deeply flawed. 14 1
IV. PARTNERSHIP AS A TAX CLASSIFICATION
This Article has shown why partnership will not and should not sur-
vive as a standard form contract that provides for unlimited liability to
creditors. This Section considers whether partnership should survive as
a tax classification.
The tax classification system determines whether a business is taxed on
a "flow-through" basis, with income taxed directly to the owners and
losses deductible against owners' income, 142 or whether income is taxed
to the business when earned, with subsequent distributions taxed again at
139. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 14-19 (1987).
140. See supra text following note 111.
141. See Section IV (C)(1) infra.
142. Deductibility of losses is subject to limitations, including the rule that losses incurred by
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the owner level. A business is considered a partnership under Sub-
chapter K of the Internal Revenue Code if it is not a "corporation," a
term that includes "association." '143 In Morrissey v. Commissioner,14 the
Court approved a test for determining "association" status based on "re-
semblance" to corporations. 145 The current "resemblance" test set forth
in the Kintner Regulations 146 provides that a business organization is a
corporation and not a partnership147 if it has at least three of the follow-
ing characteristics: Continuity of life, centralized management, limited
liability, and free transferability of interests. 148
Subsection A shows that there is no normative basis for the tax distinc-
tion between "corporations" and "partnerships." Subsection B shows
that the classification is unsuitable as an arbitrary line because it entails
significant costs. Subsection C demonstrates that, even assuming the tax
system does not move to an integrated approach in which all business
entities are treated alike, there are viable alternatives to the partnership-
corporation classification.
A. Absence of Normative Basis for the Classification System
The fundamental flaw of the classification system is that it attempts to
base a mandatory federal classification on an essentially contractual
state-law system. Under state law, the parties can draft freely for "part-
nership" and "corporate" features regardless of which standard form
they select.149 Accordingly, there is no state-law justification for basing
tax consequences on the parties' choice of label or terms. The question is
whether there is some independent federal tax related basis for attaching
these consequences to particular labels or terms.
investors who are not active in the business (i.e., "passive losses") cannot be deducted against non-
"passive" income. See I.R.C. § 469.
143. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (definition of "corporation"); I.RC. § 7701(a)(2) (definition of
"partnership").
144, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
145. Id. at 357.
146. The name refers to the case that prompted the regulations, United States v. Kintner, 216
F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), in which the I.R.S. unsuccessfully sought to characterize a professional
corporation as a partnership.
147. Other characteristics determine whether the business is neither a corporation nor a
partnership.
148. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1991). For leading cases interpreting the Kintner Regula-
tions, see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159
(1976).
149. For a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which corporate law is enabling, see Bernard
Black, Is Corporate Law Tri'ial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).
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Congress never has explained the underlying basis of the tax distinc-
tion."'0 Two rationales for the distinction are prominent in the case law
and literature.' The first is that a corporation is regarded as inherently
an entity that should be treated separately from the members for tax pur-
poses, while a partnership is inherently an aggregate of the partners so
that income associated with the business should be attributed directly to
the partners. 152
This reasoning is deeply flawed. 53 Partnerships cannot accurately be
described as "aggregates" because they have many "entity".features. For
example, partnerships can hold title154 and most ownership rights to
property, 55 and partners can act on behalf of the partnership.156 Indeed,
the current draft of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act attempts to
eliminate confusion over this issue by defining a partnership as an "en-
tity."' 57 But even this "clarification" is misleading because, despite it, a
partnership has both aggregate and entity features. More generally,
whether the business has particular "aggregate" or "entity" features, in-
150. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World? 39 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1046 n.243 (1989).
151. Other suggested justifications for the corporate tax are not only weak, but offer no basis for
distinguishing between corporations and partnerships:
(1) The tax controls corporations' monopoly power and size. See GOODE, supra note 17, at 38-
39. Even if it is sensible to use a tax for this purpose, the form of organization is only a weak proxy
for size and monopoly power. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 374 (5th ed. 1989).
(2) The tax is justified by corporations' superior ability to pay tax out of the "excess" profits of
the corporate form. But firms produce rents regardless of how they are organized. In any event, this
basis of the tax has been criticized even as applied to corporations. See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON &
JOSEPH E. STIGLrrZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 132 (1987) (tax base includes the cost of
capital); GOODE, supra note 17, at 33-34 (attacking utilitarian assumptions on which the argument is
based); Paul Studenski, Toward a Theory of Business Taxation, 48 J. POL. ECON. 621 (1940) (noting
the difficulty of structuring an excess profits tax).
(3) The tax compensates for the cost of state regulation and services that benefit business gener-
ally. See GOODE, supra note 17, at 30-32; Studenski, supra. But, once again, corporations cannot
properly be distinguished from other firms on this ground.
152. See Mortimer M. Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organization: Is it
Time for a "Doing Business" Tax?, 47 VA. L. REv. 249, 252-53 (1961) ("The separateness of the
corporate personality or the corporate entity is one of the cornerstones of our present income tax
law"); George E. Cleary, The Corporate Entity in Tax Cases, 1 TAX L. REV. 3 (1945); Rudnick,
supra note 150, at 1045, 1047-50.
153. For other critiques of the entity-aggregate reasoning see Rudnick, supra note 150, at 1049-
57; Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 835, 872-73 (1988).
154. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 8(3), 10(1) (1914).
155. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 25 (1914).
156. See generally, I BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1.03.
157. REV. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201 (1991 Draft).
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cluding tax treatment, should be based on the inherent desirability of
these features rather than on whether the firm "is" an "entity" or an
"aggregate."
The second rationale for the tax distinction is that the corporate tax is
essentially an excise tax on benefits the state confers on corporations by
according them the special privileges of doing business in the corporate
form.'58 Upholding a 1909 corporate tax as not violating the then-ex-
isting constitutional prohibition of an individual income tax, the
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with
the advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed, and
which are not enjoyed by private firms or individuals.... The continuity of
the business, without interruption by death or dissolution, the transfer of
property interests by the disposition of shares of stock, the advantages of
business controlled and managed by corporate directors, the general ab-
sence of individual liability, these and other things inhere in the advantages
of business thus conducted, which do not exist when the same business is
conducted by private individuals or partnerships. 159
The "special-privileges" rationale is no more sensible than the entity-
aggregate distinction. In the first place, there is no reason to believe that
the corporate tax properly measures the value of any benefit from corpo-
rate features."e° Firms adopt either corporate or partnership features af-
ter weighing their costs and benefits in light of the nature of the firm's
business. 161 Corporate features, therefore, are no more inherently "bene-
fits" for a corporation than are partnership features for a partnership.
158. For commentary advocating a "benefits" theory of the corporate tax, see GOODE, supra
note 17, at 27-29; Studenski, supra note 151.
159. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 162 (1911).
160. See GOODE, supra note 17, at 28. There are other problems with the "benefit" theory. It is
not clear how supposed state-conferred benefits, including limited liability, can justify the federal
corporate tax. Also, even assuming the "benefits" of corporate features could be measured, it is not
clear why they should carry a price tag, unless it is costly for society to produce them. See Mus-
GRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 151, at 373-74 (criticizing "benefits" theory in part on this
ground). For a critical evaluation of the argument that the corporate tax justifiably compensates for
the social cost of limited liability, see infra Section IV (C)(1).
161. There is an enormous literature showing the adaptive nature of organizational structure.
For some leading articles, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn,
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985);
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301
(1983); William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91
YALE LJ. 1521 (1982).
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More importantly, the "benefit" theory is unsound because the tax is
not actually based on any "special privilege" of incorporation. 62 All but
one of the supposed "privileges" of incorporation the Supreme Court
listed163 are clearly available by contract to partnerships, 1 4 and all can
be negated by corporations. 65
Limited liability is the one corporate "privilege" that could be consid-
ered a "special privilege" of incorporation. As this Article has shown,
limited liability is an attractive feature for most firms.1 66 Moreover, lim-
ited liability is not clearly available to noncorporations by contract.167
Perhaps for this reason, limited liability is the feature that best identifies
"corporateness ' ' 68 and has been singled out by some commentators as
the most important corporate tax characteristic.1 69 But limited liability,
rather than determining corporate tax treatment, is merely listed to-
162. See Alvin L. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE
L.J. 1585, 1600 n.72 (1974) (questioning "benefits" argument in part on the ground that the sup-
posed benefits are available to all).
163. See supra text accompanying note 159.
164. See Ribstein, supra note 18, at 89-91.
165. Corporate shareholders can guarantee the firm's debts and enter into agreements among
themselves restricting transferability of shares and providing for dissolution at will and decentralized
management. See infra text accompanying note 172.
166. See supra Section II.
167. Even this is questionable. For a discussion of the parties' ability to obtain limited liability
by contract without incorporation, see Ribstein, supra note 18, at 112-27.
168. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Note, however, that limited liability was not part
of the corporate form in its early states. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate
Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986); Oscar Handlin & Mary Flug Handlin, Origins of the American
Business Corporation, 5 J. EcON. HisT. 1 (1945).
For a contrary view on the importance of limited liability to the classification system, see AMERI-
CAN LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT-SUBCHAPTER K: PROPOSALS ON THE TAXA-
TION OF PARTNERS 386 (1984) (asserting that limited liability alone should not be regarded as a
sufficient reason for imposing corporate tax treatment). This view is not necessarily inconsistent
with the point in the text, which simply is that limited liability should be regarded as important if the
system is based on some conceptual difference between "partnership" and "corporation."
Limited liability arguably is also a distinctively "entity" feature that is closely associated with the
entity basis for tax classification. However, even partnership-type unlimited liability has the entity
feature that creditors in many states must first exhaust partnership assets before proceeding against
the partners' individual assets. See supra note 65.
169. See David R. Keyser, Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships: The Treasury Fights the
Wrong War, 27 TAX NOTES 527 (1985); Fred W. Peel, Definition of a Partnership: New Suggestions
on an Old Issue, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 989, 1015; Philip F. Postlewaite et al., A Critique of the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of Part-
ners, 75 GEo. L.J. 423, 450-64 (1986); Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 745 (1977).
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gether with other corporate factors in the classification regulations. 170
The arbitrariness of the corporate-partnership classification is demon-
strated by the I.R.S.'s unwillingness to allow the same factors that make
a "partnership" a tax "corporation" to work in reverse to make a close
"corporation" a "partnership." '' Close corporations offer limited liabil-
ity together with "partnership" features such as restricted transferability
and decentralized management." 2 The federal classification system
seems to compel treating a close "corporation" that adopts these features
as a tax "partnership."' 7 3 Yet this would be inconsistent with the state
law on which the federal system supposedly is based, which treats a "cor-
poration" as any firm organized under the state's corporation statute.17 4
A General Counsel Memorandum 75 initially declined to apply either the
four-factor test or the state's label, and instead derived the relevant cor-
porate features from Justice Marshall's ancient opinion in Dartmouth
College v. Woodward.' 76 The Memorandum states:
If an organization is to qualify as a corporation in this context, we believe
that it: (1) must be a legal entity; (2) must derive its existence from a char-
ter granted by a sovereign; and (3) must be able to maintain its existence
and identity throughout a continually occurring succession of persons that
have interests in it.1
7 7
Perhaps realizing the pitfalls of establishing a second tax definition of
170. Limited partnerships were characterized initially as associations, based on the limited part-
ners' limited liability, in a 1916 regulation that was reversed in 1918 and replaced by a multi-factor
resemblance test. See John J. Sexton & Donald F. Osteen, Classification as a Partnership or an
Association Taxable as a Corporation, in 24 TULANE TAx INsT. 95, 106-07 (1975). The final break
from limited liability came when the Service withdrew its earlier proposal classifying LLCs as corpo-
rations solely on the basis of limited liability of all members. See supra note 51.
Note, however, that limited liability is a significant tax classification factor because firms that
adopt limited liability must "pay" for it by adopting features that probably are net tax detriments.
See infra Section IV (B)(1). For a discussion concluding that limited liability should not determine
tax classification see infra Section IV(C)(1).
171. A similar question of whether labels or characteristics control is raised by the new Texas
"registered limited liability partnership," which offers limited liability through the general partner-
ship form. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 7.32 (1985) (permitting agreements pro-
viding for all of these features).
173. See Rudnick, supra note 150, at 1053; Note, Close Corporations and the Federal Income
Tax Laws-Should the State Label Control?, 59 IOWA L. REv. 552, 573-75 (1974).
174. It would also be inconsistent with Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, which is
intended as the only way a "corporation" can obtain flow-through tax treatment.
175. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,127 (May 18, 1977).
176. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
177. Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 175.
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"corporation" for close corporations, the General Counsel later declined
to apply either the four-factors test or standards derived from Dartmouth
College as "a separate set of tests."' 178
In short, the I.R.S. could neither apply its existing rule to close corpo-
rations nor provide a coherent alternative rule. This sort of dilemma
flows naturally from the lack of a clear normative basis for the current
classification rules.
. Cost of the Tax Classification System
This Section shows that the partnership-corporation classification sys-
tem not only lacks any discernable tax-related justification, but also is
costly. The costs of the partnership-corporation classification system
arise out of the parties' incentives in the face of the tax consequences of
choice of form. Under the partnership-corporation classification system,
parties to firms can choose to either (1) avoid the excess ("T") of two-tier
over one-tier taxation by forming a Subchapter S Corporation, adopting
two of the "partnership" features-unlimited liability, restrictions on
transferability, dissolution at will and decentralized management--or by
forming a taxable corporation but shifting to tax-deductible labor or cap-
ital inputs;'7 9 (2) bear the two-tier tax with reduced profits; or (3) shift
the tax through higher consumer prices or lower supplier costs. 180 This
178. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,953 (May 14, 1979). Note that these Memoranda in effect leaned in
favor of state labels over uniformity in a context in which the labels resulted in two-tier taxation but
in which incorporation might have facilitated some tax deductions, as for pension payments. LLCs
present the converse situation: the state's "noncorporate" label supports single-tier taxation.
179. As to these substitution effects of the corporate tax, see ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note
151, at 173-87 (discussing incidence of corporate tax in connection with general discussion of tax
incidence); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAx POLICY 153 (5th ed. 1987) (effect of corporate tax
depends on the "degree to which the noncorporate form of doing business can be substituted for the
corporate form and production can be transferred from capital-intensive to labor-intensive indus-
tries"); Posner, supra note 139, at 459 (corporate tax gives firms the incentive to employ deductible
debt or labor or to switch to noncorporate forms of business organization); Arnold C. Harberger,
The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215-40 (1962) (a leading article
discussing the effects of corporate tax in shifting capital to noncorporate sector). If the forms of
financing or organization are not perfectly equivalent for a given type of production, this may cause
capital to flow to different forms of production that offer better risk-adjusted returns.
Note that the two-tier tax influences many other financial decisions, depending on current tax
rules and rates, including acquisitions or the form in which earnings are returned to shareholders
(e.g., by dividends or share repurchase). These effects are ignored here because they are not particu-
larly relevant to classification of business enterprises.
180. The evidence of the extent to which the corporate tax has been shifted is inconclusive. See
MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 151, at 388-89; MARIAN KRZYZANIAK & RICHARD A. Mus-
GRAVE, THE SHIFrING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1963).
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Section discusses the costs associated with the first type of strategy that
result from the corporate-partnership distinction.
It is important to keep in mind that an extra firm-level tax, irrespective
of the basis of the classification, necessarily affects the allocation of re-
sources by increasing firms' capital costs or consumers' product costs as
compared with the costs in the absence of the tax. For example, if the
tax is shifted to consumers, this may, among other effects, reduce con-
sumer demand for the corporation's product, and therefore the corpora-
tion's demand for inputs. Indeed, any tax, however structured, can lead
to some distortion. Accordingly, it is important to show, as this Article
does in Section IV(C), how an alternative classification system may lead
to less costly distortion.
L Perverse Choice of Governance Rules
Substituting "partnership" for "corporate" features may cause a firm
to incur extra agency or other governance costs ("G") that it would not
incur without the tax classification. A firm will incur these costs if G <
T (the extra amount of any two-tier tax), as when the firm only must
make some minor governance adjustment to receive one-tier tax treat-
ment. The firm effectively receives a tax subsidy for incurring extra gov-
ernance costs. Because these costs neither transfer nor produce
resources, they are a deadweight cost of the tax-classification system.
a. Limited Liability
Because limited liability may be beneficial for many firms even after
considering higher credit costs,"8' it is often costly for a firm to give up
limited liability for tax benefits. As a result, many firms will adopt lim-
ited liability now that they can do so and still receive partnership tax
treatment. However, despite the increased availability of single-tier taxa-
tion for limited-liability firms, the two-tier tax continues to penalize lim-
ited liability. Because limited liability single-tier firms must negate at
least two of the other three "corporate" characteristics, limited liability
increases the importance of these other factors. At the same time, as
discussed in this Subsection, the other classification features often are net
detriments for firms that adopt limited liability.
181. See generally supra Section II.
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b. Continuity of Life
The Kintner Regulations provide that the organization lacks the cor-
porate characteristic of continuity of life if the death, insanity, bank-
ruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of a member causes
dissolution, even if the members can agree to continue the business after
a member's dissociation.182 Thus, the regulations seem to emphasize the
partners' power to cause at least a technical dissolution.I83 But the regu-
lations also provide that there is no continuity if the firm continues only
upon unanimous agreement.1 84 Thus, it is not clear whether a firm must
have a unanimity provision to lack continuity of life. 85
The continuity-of-life factor has been applied to LLCs.'86 Indeed, the
I.R.S. has answered the unanimity question in the LLC context by ruling
that a Florida LLC had continuity of life when the members could con-
tinue the business by only a majority, rather than a unanimous, vote.1 87
Accordingly, LLC members have a tax incentive to provide by agree-
ment, or to form under a statute that provides (1) for dissolution on dis-
sociation of a member; and (2) that the business can be continued after
dissociation only by unanimous vote of the remaining members.
These tax incentives to provide for discontinuity are inconsistent with
the inefficiency of such rules in many LLCs. It is undoubtedly important
for some closely held firms to provide for liquidity by letting owners cash
out of the firm at will and to resolve potential problems of valuation and
continuing liability problems by giving the dissociating partner the power
to compel sale of assets and payment of liabilities. 88 But these rights can
be costly because they facilitate opportunistic conduct by dissociating
partners.18 9 Requiring unanimity for continuation is particularly costly
182. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1991).
183. For recognition that the power to dissolve prevents continuity of life despite an agreement
to continue, see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Cl. Ct. 1975) (no continuity despite con-
tract not to dissolve entered into with creditor); Foster v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 34 (1983); Larson v.
Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159, 173-74 (1976).
184. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1991).
185. For a ruling that a royalty trust lacked continuity although only a majority vote of mem-
bers (together with a unanimous vote of the managers) was enough to continue the business follow-
ing dissolution, see Rev. Rul. 88-79, 1988-2 C.B. 361, 1988-38 I.R.B. 17.
186. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 361; Gazur & Goff, supra note 36, at 447-50.
187. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989).
188. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WVASH. U. L.Q. 357
(1987).
189. Id. at 384-89, 393-95. Moreover, even if the benefits bf the cash-out right outweigh the
costs, the parties may want to avoid the potentially costly discontinuity associated with a technical
[Vol. 70:417
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because of the negotiation costs involved in continuing the business.' 90
These costs of discontinuity, however, probably are not worth the ben-
efits in a limited liability firm. Continuation of the firm after partner
disassociation is significantly less costly in limited liability than in unlim-
ited liability firms because the departing member or estate need not be
concerned with whether the firm pays continuing liabilities, and continu-
ing members need not worry about increased exposure to liability result-
ing from the departure of a members.
c. Free Transferability
The Kintner Regulations provide that a firm does not have the corpo-
rate characteristic of free transferability if a member cannot assign man-
agement rights (as distinguished from a right merely to participate in
profits) without the consent of the other general partners. 191 This rule
has been applied to LLCs. 92 Moreover, even if a firm has no other cor-
porate characteristics, it is usually treated as a corporation if it has inter-
ests that are traded or are "readily tradable."' ' Thus, a firm with truly
liquid interests generally cannot be taxed as a partnership, and a limited
liability firm with relatively illiquid but legally transferable interests can-
not be taxed as a partnership unless it lacks both centralized manage-
ment and continuity of life.
Transfer restrictions may be appropriate in a closely held firm because
members are concerned with who their associates are, with how control
is allocated, and with conflicts of interest that new members may intro-
duce.' 94 General partners also may be concerned about admitting new
"dissolution" of the firm. Dissolution may cause agreements to terminate or fail to cover the succes-
sor entity. See Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (successor
partnership not entitled to sue under policy guaranteeing title of original partnership); Frederick C.
Smith Clinic v. Lastrapes, 170 N.E. 2d 497 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (noncompetition covenant unen-
forceable after change in firm's membership when contract provided for automatic termination on
dissolution). Fairway was particularly notorious, forcing real estate firms to include special "Fair-
way" clauses to deal with the problem.
190, For a discussion of the escalation in decisionmaking costs associated with requiring a high
percentage vote for approval, see JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT 105-09 (1962).
191. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1991).
192. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. at 361.
193. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1988).
194. On the latter point, see William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination
Costs, Control Premiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1987) (investors may have
different preferences concerning financial policies such as the timing of distributions). For a discus-
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members who can recklessly incur new liabilities for which the members
are personally responsible.
This emphasis on illiquidity, however, has significant governance costs
since it is expensive to secure unanimous agreement to transfers 95 and to
give members hold-up powers they can use opportunistically. 9 6 As with
continuity of life, these costs are unlikely to outweigh the benefits for
limited liability firms because limited liability members have significantly
less reason than individually liable owners to care who their co-members
are. 197 Nevertheless, as discussed below, 198 a liquidity test for flow-
through treatment focusing on marketability rather than consent restric-
tions does have some merit.
d. Centralized Management
The Kintner Regulations provide that a firm has the corporate charac-
teristic of centralized management if any person or subgroup of members
has exclusive management authority. 199 This factor does not appear to
involve a significant problem for LLCs, given the other factors discussed
above. An LLC that adopts limited liability must lack either continuity
of life or free transferability, and thus almost necessarily will be closely
held. Owners of a closely held firm ordinarily prefer to participate di-
rectly in management because they cannot easily protect themselves from
mismanagement by selling their shares in an efficient market.
Decentralized management may, however, involve significant govern-
ance costs even in a closely held firm. First, members of such a firm may
wish to be passive, consistent with a strategy of holding a diversified port-
folio of investments. Indeed, one of the most important advantages of
sion showing how limited liability may be an efficient contract even in closely held firms, see Rib-
stein, supra note 18, at 101-06.
195. In Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency, Inc., 801 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner
reasoned that the rule against restricting transfer in close corporations was based on the higher costs
of securing agreements to transfer. He expressed these costs mathematically in terms of an n-mem-
ber set as n(n-l)/2. For the similar problem in connection with continuation agreements, see supra
text accompanying note 190.
196. For an example of a case in which the court refused to enforce a consent restriction on
share transfer when the nonconsenting member may have been withholding consent opportunisti-
cally to obtain the shares cheaply himself, see Rafe v. Hindin, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662 (App. Div. 1968),
aff'd mer. 244 N.E.2d 469 (N.Y. 1968).
197. However, as discussed in the next subsection, decentralized management may give even
limited liability members an incentive to screen co-members.
198. See infra Section IV(C)(3).
199. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1991).
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limited liability is that it facilitates separation of management and risk
bearing. 2°°
Second, centralized management meshes well with dissolution at will,
which many closely held firms are likely to adopt, particuiarly in light of
the tax-classification factors. Members' ability to dissolve the firm at will
gives them an effective veto power that decreases the benefit of having a
direct say in the firm's decisions.
Third, een if members might want some role in management, they
may have an even greater desire that their co-members be passive. The
partnership model of decentralized management generally means that
each owner is, in effect, an agent of the firm who can bind the firm to
contracts and torts.20 1 Giving members the power to bind the firm may
necessitate costly monitoring, bonding, and screening of members.
Because of these costs of decentralized management, members of lim-
ited liability firms may prefer to adopt centralized management. Not
surprisingly, therefore, LLC statutes at least permit LLCs to be managed
by elected managers.2 "2 One LLC statute even mandates centralized
management.203 But an LLC that adopts centralized management must
accept either corporate tax treatment or stringent, and possibly costly,
constraints on both transferability and continuity of life.
2. Risk and Uncertainty
In addition to encouraging perverse governance choices, the attempt to
identify "partnership" or "corporation" features results in costly uncer-
tainty because tax rules cannot categorize the nearly infinite number of
possible agreements into which the parties can enter under state law.
This problem results from trying to fit a scheme of federal uniformity
into one of state contractual variation. The more the uncertainty about
classification, the greater the volatility of after-tax cash flows of firms
seeking "partnership" classification. It is costly for risk-averse investors
200. See Ribstein, supra note 18, at 105 (discussing this as an advantage of limited liability even
in closely held firms).
201. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 9-14 (1914). This is a feature of many LLC statutes.
See infra note 202. Indeed, giving all members the power to bind may be necessary to avoid the
"corporate" feature of centralized management. See infra text following note 215.
202. See FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1990); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.071; 86.291 (1991); 1991 TEX. SEss. LAW SERV. CH. 901, § 46, ART. 2.12
(VERNON); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125(2) (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024 (Michie
Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977).
203. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401 (Supp. 1990).
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to assume this risk or to attempt to reduce it by diversification. The
uncertainty also affects lawyers, who are exposed to potential malpractice
liability as a result of frustrated client expectations concerning tax classi-
fication. Following are some examples of the uncertainty inherent in
each classification factor.
a. Limited Liability
Although this characteristic seems to be clear, it is not. It is uncertain
whether it is present for owners who adopt a limited liability standard
form but give personal guarantees. 2" Conversely, it is unclear whether a
"partnership" lacks limited liability if it wholly or partially opts out of
unlimited liability. Even if creditors enter into nonrecourse contracts
with all voluntary creditors, they would still be exposed to tort liability.
More recently, Texas has made it possible for partners partially to limit
their personal liability for co-partners' torts by forming a "registered lim-
ited liability partnership."2 "5 It is not clear whether a nominal partner-
ship that only partially limits liability has "corporate-type" "limited
liability."
b. Continuity of Life
It is uncertain whether a firm has continuity if the parties can continue
the business by less than a unanimous vote after member dissociation.20 6
204. As discussed supra at notes 68-72, many closely held firms might prefer this form of limited
liability.
205. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b §§ 2, 15, 45-A to 45-C (West Supp. 1992).
Section 15(l) provides that partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership debts and obliga-
tions, except as provided by § 15(2). Id. §§ 15(2) and (3) provides:
(2) A partner in a registered limited liablity partnership is not individually liable for debts
and obligations of the partnership arising from errors, omissions, negligence, incompe-
tence, or malfeasance committed in the course of the partnership business by another part-
ner or a representative of the partnership not working under the supervision or direction of
the first partner at the time the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance
occurred, unless the first partner:
(a) was directly involved in the specific activity in which the errors, omissions, negli-
gence, incompetence, or malfeasance were committed by the other partner or representa-
tive; or
(b) had notice or knowledge of the errors, omissions, neglicence, incompetence, or mal-
feasance by the other partner or representative at the time of occurrence.
(3) Paragraph (2) does not affect the joint and several liability of a partner for debts and
obligations of the partnership arising from any cause other than those specified in para-
graph (2).
Id.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
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Even if this question were settled in favor of continuity of life, it still
would not be clear what would happen if the parties agreed that the firm
could be continued following member withdrawal only by unanimous
vote, if the agreement also prohibited dissociation, backed up by specific
enforcement or heavy liquidated damages.20 7 Indeed, the Uniform Part-
nership Act itself penalizes partner dissociation prior to expiration of an
agreed term or completion of an agreed undertaking.208 The courts have
held that there is no continuity of life as long as there is a power to
dissolve, even if there is no right to do so.2" But the firm nevertheless
might have continuity of life if the penalties made the "power" illusory.
Similarly, the firm may or may not have continuity of life if the members
can withdraw at will but have pre-agreed to vote for continuation of the
firm after withdrawal, subject to enforcement by injunction or severe
penalties, or if the members have given a binding power of attorney to
the co-members to vote for continuation.
c. Free Transferability
Questions similar to those just discussed concern the tax effect of pro-
visions in the parties' operating agreement that bind the partners, subject
to significant penalties or specific performance, to vote for transfers.
There is also a question whether an interest has been fully transferred if it
has been assigned and the assignee has significant management-type
rights to information and to compel dissolution.
d. Centralized Management
This "corporate" feature raises particularly troublesome questions.
207. There is some question whether an agreement to continue in a partnership is specifically
enforceable. See Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1984) (refusing
to allow withdrawal from joint venture); Robert W. Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships, 37 U. FLA.
L. REv. 691 (1985). Even if such an agreement is not specifically enforceable, perhaps an agreement
not to withdraw from an LLC or other limited liability firm should be, as long as this does not
require judicial supervision of an agreement to perform personal services. The reason for the distinc-
tion is that in an LLC, unlike a partnership, mandating continuation does not force the member to
continue being personally liable for the firm's debts, which might entail an indefinite investment of
human capital in monitoring. See Ribstein, supra note 188, at 378-79 (discussing this basis of the
dissolution-at-will rule). Specifically enforcing continuation of an LLC is, in effect, no different from
prohibiting the members from cashing out-a right they would not have in a standard-form
corporation.
208. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2) (1914) (prematurely dissolving partner subject to
damages and not entitled to share of firm's goodwill).
209. See supra note 183.
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There is centralized management in a limited partnership "if substan-
tially all the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited part-
ners."21 0 The I.R.S. will rule that a limited partnership has centralized
management if the limited partners' interests exceed eighty percent of the
total partnership interests.2" But the I.R.S. ruled that a twenty-five-
member LLC managed by three of its members had centralized manage-
ment without specifying what percentage interest the managers
owned.21 2 Thus, the limited partnership eighty-percent rule may not ap-
ply to LLCs.
The limited partnership rule arguably should not be applied to an LLC
with designated managers, since LLC members, unlike limited part-
ners, 213 generally can participate in day-to-day control even if some
power is delegated to member-managers. If the rule is not applied in this
situation, the LLC has centralized management if the LLC statute or
operating agreement explicitly places all management power in the man-
agers. 214 But the result is unclear if there are managers whose power is
restricted, or if managers have plenary power but any member can bind
the firm,2 15 or if there are no designated managers but only a few of the
members have the right or power to bind the firm.
Similar questions arise even if the limited partnership eighty-percent-
210. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1991).
211. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, 801.
212. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
213. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303 (1985) (limited partner may be
liable for participating in control). The rule is based on the personal liability of the general partners.
For criticism of the rule, see Joseph J. Basile, Jr., Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An Argu-
mentfor the Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1199 (1985); Ribstein, supra note 34,
at 48-52. One state has abolished the "control rule." See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-303 (Michie
1988).
214. The Colorado statute requires the LLC to be managed by managers, but does not prohibit
the firm from making some or all of its members managers. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-401
(Supp. 1990). The Texas statute provides for management by members unless the LLC's regulations
provide otherwise. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 61326 § 2.12 (West Supp. 1992). The other
LLC statutes provide for management by members unless the members agree otherwise. See FLA.
STAT. § 608.422 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1990); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.291 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125(2) (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024
(Michie Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977).
215. Under some statutes, members automatically have the power to bind the firm. See FLA.
STAT. § 608.424(2) (Supp. 1989); TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 2.10(2) (West Supp. 1992));
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125(l) (Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-117 (1977). Under other stat-
utes the members have only the power to bind provided for in the articles of organization or operat-
ing agreement. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.301
(1991).
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rule is generally applied to LLCs because the rule would not apply to
LLCs in which there is no delegation to managers.216 Thus, it would
have to be determined when the LLC's management passed the threshold
for centralization-for example, when the members have merely dele-
gated some ministerial power to managers.
3. Loss of Drafting Flexibility
Firms cannot easily reduce the uncertainty discussed in Subsection 2.
Until the I.R.S. rules generally on an issue, the firms must obtain "pri-
vate letter" rulings.2 17 But these rulings are expensive, result in signifi-
cant delay,2"' and lack precedential value.2 19
Alternatively, state legislatures can reduce uncertainty by enacting
mandatory provisions designed to ensure that all firms formed under the
statute receive partnership tax classification without risk of error, or by
conforming their statutes to uniform laws that have received a partner-
ship-classification ruling. These responses to the tax-classification system
reduce firms' ability to adapt terms to specific circumstances and reduce
innovation by firms and state legislatures.220
Indeed, this has been the dominant legislative strategy concerning
LLCs. Unlike limited partnerships, whose tax classification is relatively
settled by a long history of public and private rulings, LLCs have only a
relatively limited tax history as tax "partnerships. ' '221  Thus, there is
more uncertainty in LLCs than in limited partnerships concerning such
216. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (December 7, 1989) (no centralized management in LLC that
did not provide for a manager).
217. The Service may issue a general ruling on, for example, a particular LLC statute, but this
ruling may not be very useful if the statute permits variations and the Service has not ruled on the
effect of adopting these variations.
218. Based on anecdotal information and an informal study of private letter rulings, the time
from request to issuance is around six months.
219. See I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1988).
220. For example, firms formed pursuant to the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act are
tax partnerships. But there is a question whether a state statute that is slightly different will receive
this classification. For a 1989 listing of such statutes deemed to conform with REVISED UNIFORM
LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, see Rev. Rul. 89-123, 1989-2 C.B. 261. The Georgia version, which be-
came effective in April 1988, remained for three years in a sort of tax limbo awaiting a ruling that it
was similar to the REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT despite its rejection of the "control
rule." The ruling finally came in September 1991. See Rev. Rul. 91-51, 1991-38 I.R.B. 4. Indeed,
this uncertainty about the tax status of the control rule may have been at least partly responsible for
the development of LLCs, which are very similar to limited partnerships without a control rule.
221. See supra note 170.
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matters as centralized management and limited liability.2 2 2 To compen-
sate for the limited tax guidance, the LLC statutes are more rigid con-
cerning some corporate characteristics than limited partnership statutes.
The two most important examples of LLC rigidity concern transfera-
bility and continuity. Under most of the LLC statutes enacted to date, a
transferee of an interest does not obtain full management rights, as dis-
tinguished from merely financial rights, unless the non-transferring part-
ners consent to the transfer.223 Although the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act also conditions transfer of management rights on unani-
mous agreement by the non-transferring partners,224 that Act, unlike the
LLC statutes, 225 lets the partners "pre-agree" to transfer in the partner-
ship agreement.226 Accordingly, most LLC statutes help ensure that
firms organized under the statute will lack the "corporate" tax feature of
free transferability of interests. Similarly, while most LLC statutes pro-
vide that the firm continues following dissociation of a member only if
the remaining members unanimously consent to continuation,227 the
222. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. at 798-801. See supra text accompanying note 211
(providing guidance as to the circumstances in which I.R.S. will rule in favor of partnership tax
classification of limited partnership).
223. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-702 (Supp 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.432 (Supp. 1989); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.351 (1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1040 (Michie Supp. 1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b §§ 4.05 to 4.07 (West
Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-131 (Supp. 1991) (requiring only majority vote); WYO.
STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977).
224. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 401 (1985) (admission of general part-
ner); id. § 704 (right of assignee of limited partnership interest to become limited partner).
225. This is true of all but the Texas statute cited supra note 223.
226. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 401 (1985) (additional general partners
may be admitted "as provided in writing in the partnership agreement); id. § 704 (a) (assignor may
give assignee of limited partnership interest the right to become a limited partner "in accordance
with authority described in the partnership agreement"). Although § 401 only refers to "additional"
general partners, any question that the same rule applies to a transfer of interests is eliminated by
§ 18 of the Uniform Partnership Act, which provides: "subject to any agreement between [the part-
ners] .. .(g) No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the
partners." UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18 (1914). "Agreement" in the lead-in to the section
obviously is not limited to the contemporaneous "consent" provided for in subsection (g). The Uni-
form Partnership Act applies to limited partnerships to the extent that there is no inconsistent lim-
ited partnership act provision. See id. § 6(2); REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1104
(1985). For an argument that a contemporaneous consent requirement existed under the prior ver-
sion of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, see Joseph J. Basile, Jr., Admission of Additional and
Substitute General Partners to a Limited Partnership: A Proposal for Freedom of Contract, 1984
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 235. For another discussion comparing LLCs and limited partnerships in this re-
spect, see Gazur & Goff, supra note 26, at 414-15.
227. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(c) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.491
(1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.11046(3) (Michie Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123(a)(iii) (1977).
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Uniform Limited Partnership Act provides that the business of a limited
partnership may be continued pursuant to a written partnership agree-
ment even without the partners' contemporaneous consent, as long as
there is at least one remaining general partner.228
C. Alternative Classification Systems
The absence of a normative basis for the partnership-corporation clas-
sification, coupled with a showing that the classification imposes signifi-
cant costs, presents a powerful case against this system. But any attempt
to identify firms that should be taxed on a two-tier basis is, perhaps, sub-
ject to the same criticisms. If so, the argument reduces to one over
whether corporate and individual taxes should be integrated and the
double tax eliminated.229 In other words, as long as it is accepted that
some firms will be taxed on a two-tier basis, the case against the current
classification system is incomplete without a showing that there is some
better method of distinguishing among firms. This Subsection examines
three alternative classification methods suggested by modem arguments
for the two-tier tax.23
1. Limited Liability
Although limited liability is not now the determinative factor in distin-
guishing one- and two-tier firms, it is worth exploring whether it should
be. First, a limited-liability-based test would at least reduce the costs
discussed in Subsection B. Limited liability is the "corporate" feature
that most clearly distinguishes between "corporations" and "partner-
ships." Because firms easily can contract for the other "corporate"
terms, regardless of the standard form they adopt, the rules for determin-
For LLC statutes that permit the members to provide for continuation in their agreement, see FLA.
STAT. § 608.441 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(3) (Supp. 1990); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b § 6.01 (West Supp. 1992).
228. See REVISED UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801(4) (1985). For another discussion
comparing limited partnerships and LLCs in this respect, see Gazur & Goff, supra note 36, at 420-
24.
229. For a comprehensive discussion of integration, see Alvin Warren, The Relation and Inte-
gration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981).
Saul Levmore suggests that single-tier taxation is not necessarily ideal. See Levmore, supra note
17, at 493-94. I agree. I only question whether the classification system should be based on the
distinction between "partnerships" and "corporations" given that some firms are taxed on a two-tier
basis.
230. For a critical discussion of some traditional reasons given for the two-tier tax, see supra
note 151.
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ing when these terms are "corporate" necessarily are complex, unpredict-
able, and costly to follow.
Second, it is important to evaluate the limited liability characteristic
for a complete critique of the current system. A firm that adopts limited
liability must be careful to reject two of the remaining three "corporate"
characteristics if it wants partnership tax treatment. Because of the poor
fit between limited liability and the partnership features,231 as well as the
costs of unpredictability and uncertainty,232 the current system in effect
induces firms either to adopt partnership-type unlimited liability or to
adopt limited liability and forego the single-tier tax. Accordingly, the
corporate tax can be considered the price of limited liability even under
the current system, in which limited liability is not determinative.
Kose John, Lemma Senbet, and Anant Sundaram argue that a sepa-
rate entity-level tax appropriately offsets the potential for over-invest-
ment in risky projects that results from limited liability.233 They point
out that limited liability arose prior to corporate taxation to facilitate
investment in risky projects. The development of capital markets pro-
vided an alternative risk-sharing mechanism such that incentives to take
risk became excessive under limited liability and had to be counterbal-
anced by corporate taxation. The authors show how to design a tax sys-
tem in which, even with a single set of tax rates, different technologies
can be taxed differently through devices such as tax credits and deduc-
tions.234 They also show that the tax system actually displays some of
these features.
There are several problems with this argument. First, it is unclear
whether any externality results under unlimited liability, given the par-
ties' incentives to insure and take care under limited liability, the poten-
tial problems with extended liability of shareholders, and the parties'
ability to evade exposure under an unlimited liability regime.235 Second,
reputational and other constraints on excessive risk taking probably will
cause any externalities to differ even among businesses in the same activ-
231. See supra Section IV(B)(1)(b)-(d).
232. See supra Section IV(B)(2).
233. See KOSE JOHN ET AL., CORPORATE LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE DESIGN OF FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTION (New York University Business School Working Paper No. S-91-16, 1991).
234. In an earlier paper, two of the authors argued that encouraging debt by means of a tax
deduction can offset incentives to take excessive risk. See KosE JOHN & LEMMA W. SENBET, LIM-
ITED LIABILITY, TAx DEDUCTIBILITY OF CORPORATE DEBT AND PUBLIC POLICY (New York
University Business School Working Paper No. 544, 1989).
235. See supra Section III.
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ity. As a result, the tax would have to be designed on a firm-by-firm
basis. It is highly unlikely that merely human lawmakers could imple-
ment such a plan.
Third, even if a corporate tax could be designed to measure firms' ex-
cessive risk taking under limited liability, the measurement would be
based on historical data concerning firms' risk-creating behavior. After
paying the tax "price" of entering risky limited liability activities, firms
would be as free to impose uncompensated risks as they are without the
tax. The tax would be an effective constraint only if the government
functioned as an insurer and engaged in monitoring, experience rating,
and premium re-evaluation.236 There are significant problems in moti-
vating government agents to perform these tasks adequately. Moreover,
the results under federal deposit insurance should give some pause as to
the desirability of using the corporate tax as an extensive federal insur-
ance system covering creditors of all limited liability firms.
In short, the only normative reason for basing the two-tiered tax on
limited liability is that a single-factor classification would reduce some of
the perverse governance and unpredictability costs that exist under the
present multi-factor system. As discussed below,237 there is a stronger
case for making liquidity the single factor.
2. Private Ordering: The Corporate Tax and Agency Cost
Hideki Kanda and Saul Levmore argue that a two-tiered tax system
reduces agency costs. They maintain that imposing a separate entity-
level tax eliminates perverse incentives high-bracket owner managers
might have under a single owner-level tax system to time asset disposi-
tions to minimize their own tax liabilities.23 While the two-tier system
236. For a model of taxes on limited liability as an insurance system, see Anindya Banerjee &
Timothy Besley, Moral Hazard, Limited Liability and Taxation: A Principal-Agent Model, 42 Ox-
FORD ECON. PAPERS 46 (1990). The authors argue that taxes on limited liability should be distrib-
uted to creditors who could pass the subsidy back to managers in the form of a lower interest rate.
The authors at first assert that the lower interest rate not only offsets the moral hazard effect of the
taxes, but also further increases the managers' effort, leading to a reduced interest rate compared to
limited liability without the tax. Id. at 54. But it is unclear how the subsidy to creditors can make
the managers better off than they would be without any tax. Indeed, the authors later say that their
argument "should not be taken as a vindication of the view that taxes should be higher in the pres-
ence of limited liability. We prefer to regard it as saying that a non-zero transfer to creditors is
optimal." Id. at 57.
237. See infra Section IV(C)(3).
238. Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA.
L. REV. 211 (1991). Kanda and Levmore also maintain that a two-tier tax makes sense as the price
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may give managers a tax incentive to delay distributions, the authors ar-
gue that asset-disposition decisions are more important than distribution
decisions because the shareholders can create "homemade dividends" by
selling and realizing capital gains, and because disposition decisions have
a greater effect on real resource allocation than distribution decisions.239
Kanda and Levmore argue that parties will choose two-tier taxation
when the agency costs of one-tier taxation, including the costs of con-
tracts and other incentive devices designed to minimize these costs, ex-
ceed the extra tax and other costs of the corporate form.2 °
Although Kanda and Levmore purport to justify the current system,
they fail to do so. The current system is based on a mandatory tax defini-
tion of the classification categories. In other words, firms can choose
their tax status only by choosing the appropriate governance terms.
Thus, owners who adopt particular governance terms may be forced to
accept two-tier taxation whether they want it or not. Even if these terms
relate to agency-cost protection, there is no reason not to let investors
make the tradeoffs themselves. For example, partnerships with freely
traded or tradable shares generally cannot elect to be taxed on a single-
tier basis.24 While Kanda and Levmore argue that free transferability
reduces agency costs connected with the firm's distribution policy, they
concede that investors themselves could decide on one- or two-tier taxa-
tion after they have selected free transferability, rather than being forced
by the tax system into a particular choice.242
More importantly for present purposes, the Kanda-Levmore argument
of giving distributees the power to control the timing of distributions, and therefore to delay the
triggering of the second tax. See id. at 213-26. However, as they note, this explains only that owners
should have to pay for controlling the timing of distributions, and not why they should have such
control, or why owners who select corporate features such as limited liability and free transferability
for reasons other than to control timing nevertheless must accept the second-level tax. Id. at 226.
The latter point is particularly significant for present purposes since, under the current rate struc-
ture, incorporation is never a tax advantage even with the ability to control timing. See supra note
51.
239. Kanda & Levmore, supra note 238, at 236-37.
240. Id. at 238-40.
241. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
242. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 238, at 252 n.90. In the same note, Kanda and Levmore
argue that free transferability might relate to owners' control over distributions in the sense of en-
abling them to create "homemade dividends." However, the "control" explanation for two-tier tax-
ation is incomplete. See id. Finally, Saul Levmore argues in his comment on my Article that tax
rules must constrain firms from seeking "windfalls" through midstream changes. See Levmore,
supra note 17, at 494. Even if this is a significant problem, Levmore nowhere shows how the part-
nership-corporation classification rules contribute to its solution.
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does not support an alternative system in which the parties can choose
tax classification, just as they choose other elements of their contract, by
electing the corporate or partnership form and then freely contracting
within that form. The problem is that there is no reason why parties to
firms ever would want to pay the government for this agency-cost protec-
tion. In the first place, perverse asset deployment can occur only when
(1) managers are in a relatively higher tax bracket than most owners; (2)
it is in the managers' interests either to retain the asset (to avoid recogni-
tion of gain) or to sell (to recognize a loss that managers can deduct
against their other income); (3) it is in the other owners' interests to sub-
stitute a lower-cost asset or to retain the one it has; and (4) there is no
readily available alternative (such as leasing the existing or substitute as-
set) that would yield a favorable tax result for the manager while not
penalizing the other owners. This combination of circumstances is suffi-
ciently unlikely that firms rarely would choose to meet it with two-tier
taxation.
Moreover, Kanda and Levmore do not make a persuasive case that the
two-tier tax is a better way than private contracting to deal with this sort
of agency cost. They paint a dismal picture of the ability of shareholders
to deal with these problems through derivative suits and direct constaints
on management.243 Yet, as they note, 2 " firms can deal with these
problems through such devices as supermajority voting and incentive
compensation. Moreover, Kanda and Levmore show how regulators and
taxing authorities have been able to design rules for such single-tier forms
as mutual funds that minimize the asset-disposition problem even when
owners lack significant controls.245 It is not clear why private parties
could not develop such forms.
3. Liquidity
The classification system appears to be moving toward a liquidity-
based distinction that may be preferable to the current corporation-part-
nership distinction. As a result of the 1988 rule subjecting "publicly
traded partnerships" to corporate tax treatment, 246 most publicly held
243. See Kanda and Levmore, supra note 238, at 231-32.
244. Id. at 240.
245. Id. at 245-50.
246. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1988). For a discussion and criticism of this provision, see Ribstein,
supra note 34, at 874-77. "Publicly traded partnership" means a partnership whose interests are
traded in an established securities market or are "readily tradable" on a market. I.R.C. § 7704(b).
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firms2 47 now cannot obtain single-tier treatment. Conversely, in light of
the I.R.S.'s recognition of LLCs,248 virtually any closely held firm can
obtain partnership tax classification by fine-tuning its governance struc-
ture to conform to the classification rules. In other words, for most
closely held firms, governance costs of adopting flow-through tax are
now less than the avoided tax.2 49 As a result of these changes, a switch
to a system squarely based on the liquidity factor probably would have
only minor revenue implications. At the same time, such a single-factor
test would be superior to the current system by saving the extra govern-
ance costs and unpredictability inherent in applying the four-factor
test.2
50
The appropriate liquidity test is clear, predictable, and does not so
completely shackle the holders as to cause high opportunism or decision
costs. 251 One possibility would be a rule like that for publicly traded
partnerships based on trading or tradability of the stock rather than the
"free transferability" characteristic under the four-factor test. Profes-
sional firms, or firms with relatively few owners or decentralized manage-
ment, or with any sort of a restriction on transferability, clearly would
not have liquid shares under this test. Another alternative simply would
be to have an upper limit on the number of shareholders without directly
restricting transferability.
It is important not to push the liquidity argument too far. Rebecca
Rudnick has attempted to make a normative argument for a liquidity-
based approach.252 Rudnick's argument is based largely on the assump-
tions that a liquidity test would appropriately impose a tax on pure profit
and that firms' demand for liquidity is inelastic such that the tax would
not cause firms to shift to other organizational forms to avoid it. The
"pure profit" assumption ignores entrepreneurs' adapting organizational
247. The exception is firms having gross income consisting 90% or more of "qualifying" (i.e.,
"passive") income. See I.R.C. § 7704(c)-(d).
248. See supra note 51, and accompanying text.
249. That is particularly true in light of the fact that liberal rules regarding internal governance
commonly are available only to firms that that have restricted liquidity. See MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. Acr, § 7.32(d) (1985) (close corporation provisions available only if firm not listed on na-
tional securities exchange or regularly traded by securities dealers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342
(a) (1991) (special close corporation provisions available only if corporation's stock is subject to
restrictions on transfer, is held by 30 or fewer persons, and corporation has not made a public
offering of its securities).
250. See supra Section IV (B).
251. See supra notes 195-96.
252. See Rudnick, supra note 150.
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forms to suit different types of businesses. Accordingly, tax considera-
tions aside, freely transferable shares are no more inherently a benefit for
a firm that adopts this feature than are non-transferable shares for a
closely held firm.
Rudnick's "inelasticity" assumption ignores the fact that a liquidity
tax will cause capital to shift to forms of production for which illiquid
shares are efficient.253 Indeed, Rudnick herself defends the liquidity test
partly on the basis that it funnels capital to start-up firms. 254 The most
that can be said for the "inelasticity" argument is that firms are less
likely to give up liquidity than other features solely for tax reasons (that
is, the usual case for liquidity is G > T).2 "
In short, a liquidity-based test may not be the best available means of
distinguishing one- and two-tier firms. But for present purposes it is
enough to conclude that such a test would be superior to the four-factor
partnership-corporation distinction now being employed.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS FORMS
This Article has argued that the partnership form has been preserved
by legal rules that make limited liability costly, including the tax distinc-
tion between partnership and corporation. These rules are normatively
unjustified. Moreover, their demise is signalled by the proliferation of
LLC statutes and new tax rules that are more favorable to limited liabil-
ity. This Conclusion briefly discusses the legal regime that can be ex-
pected to emerge from these developments.
First, many more states almost certainly will adopt LLC statutes. The
two forces driving this development are tax rules and the state competi-
tion for business formation. Tax regulation probably will continue to
favor LLCs since there does not appear to be any powerful interest group
injured by this regulation.256 As long as tax rules permit the attractive
253. For a leading discussion of the business factors relevant to the choice between "open" (pub-
licly traded) and closely held organizational forms, see Fama & Jensen, supra note 76.
254. See Rudnick, supra note 150, at 1190, 1216-18.
255. As discussed supra note 238, Kanda and Levmore argue that a transferability test is consis-
tent with their control theory of the two-tier tax. However, as already discussed, this theory is
suspect. See supra note 238.
256. See Roe, Political Elements, supra note 3, at 1498 (arguing for a "survival" theory under
which tax rules emerge from the bureaucracy without interest group pressure and survive if not
opposed by powerful interest groups or other political forces). By comparison, the emergence of
publicly traded limited partnership was halted by legislation, see supra text accompanying note 245,
when the revenue implications of the "disincorporation" boom became apparent.
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combination of limited liability and partnership taxation while penalizing
incorporation, the pressure for state legislation permitting or facilitating
these firms can be expected to continue. The significant financial benefits
of LLCs make them attractive to business people and, therefore, generate
fees for lawyers during a general recession for legal business. 257 Bar
groups are a potentially potent interest group in pressing for LLC legisla-
tion. State legislators comfortably can respond to this pressure on the
ground that otherwise business may leave the state and form in a neigh-
boring LLC state.258 In any event, state legislators have no personal in-
terest in resisting LLC statutes, since they would not be giving up an
opportunity to earn rents as was the case in the move away from special
chartering of corporations.259
The move toward LLCs will come at the expense of other, more costly,
limited liability business forms for closely held firms, including limited
partnerships, statutory close corporations, and Subchapter S Corpora-
tions.2 ° Moreover, as this Article has shown,261 many fewer firms will
adopt unlimited liability through the general partnership form than was
formerly the case. This development may be hastened by the project cur-
rently underway to revise the Uniform Partnership Act, which so far has
introduced costly unpredictability without resolving many of the impor-
tant problems inhibiting modem use of this ancient form.262
257. Lawyers might say that LLCs generate something for law professors to write about.
258. Note that the state competition for LLCs may not work the same way that state competi-
tion for corporate charters worked to pressure corporate law toward freedom of contract. Once it
was recognized that, under comity principles, foreign corporations must be recognized outside their
states of organization, firms could form in foreign states and return to their home states to transact
business. As a result, the states had to compete for chartering business. For a discussion of the role
of state competition for chartering business in the development of modern corporate statutes, see
Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privi-
leges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1985). But comity principles are not clearly recognized for LLCs.
Thus, a state that does not provide by statute for foreign LLCs may be able to avoid recognizing the
limited liability of a foreign-state LLC that has at least minimum contacts with the forum state. See
supra note 45. Moreover, most LLCs are closely held, so that it is costly relative to the size of the
firm to pay taxes and fees in more than one state. See Ayres, supra note 18, at 374-75 (making
similar argument about close corporation rules). The state competition concerning LLCs is, there-
fore, more for capital itself than for chartering business.
259. See Butler, supra note 259.
260. See supra Section I. There is some possibility, however, that limited partnerships could
experience a resurgence in light of the recent tax ruling (that, in effect, sanctions abolition of the
"control rule." See supra note 220. And incorporation could remain important if there is a return
to pre-1986 tax rates that favored incorporation for firms that retain earnings.
261. See supra Section II.
262. For a critique of an early draft of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act see Larry E. Rib-
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The partnership form is, however, likely to survive in at least two situ-
ations. First, there undoubtedly will be many existing firms for which
the move to a new organizational form will involve significant transition
costs. These could be either tax costs (particularly the recognition of
gain on appreciated assets) or the costs of negotiating new agreements
among partners or with creditors. Second, many smaller firms that have
no agreement will continue to be characterized as general partnerships.
In any event, partnership law is likely to survive insofar as partnership
statutory provisions are adopted in LLC statutes. Alternatively, some
states may follow Texas' lead263 and adopt limited liability within the
context of general partnership statutes.
Perhaps in the long run limited liability might come to be regarded as
the residual business form, with individual liability reserved for firms
that make special filings. This could result not only from the wider ac-
ceptance of limited liability, but also from the reduced attractiveness to
creditors of individual liability because of procedural barriers and ex-
haustion requirements that focus liability on the firm rather than on the
individual partners. 2"
Whatever happens, the development and tax recognition of LLCs
promises to change the law of business associations radically and to pro-
vide more evidence of how government regulation has shaped the firm.
stein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW.
111 (1990).
263. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
264. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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